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6Executive summary 
Industry in Europe is faced with an unprecedented 
number of new challenges and megatrends, from a 
slowdown in global trade to digital disruption and 
climate change. In a fast-changing world, industry 
remains the backbone of the European economy, 
delivering high-quality jobs, innovation and world-class 
companies. Thus, to stay ahead of the curve and retain 
its competitive edge, the EU must embrace change and 
renew its industrial strategy. 
There is growing momentum for a revived EU industrial 
strategy. EU leaders have called on the European 
Commission to present a new “long-term vision” for the 
EU’s industrial future by the end of 2019. Commission 
President-elect Ursula von der Leyen has pledged 
to put forward a new industrial strategy as part of a 
“European Green Deal”. Several member states have 
also been vocal on the need for a gear change in the EU’s 
approach, including the much-debated calls from France 
and Germany to modernise EU competition policy and 
support the creation of ‘European champions’, as well 
as others underlining the well-functioning of the Single 
Market as the basis for competitiveness. 
European industry is therefore set to become a priority for 
the upcoming Commission, with important cross-cutting 
implications for major portfolios such as “The European 
Green Deal”, “A Europe fit for the Digital Age”, “An 
Economy that Works for People” and “A Stronger Europe 
in the World”. It is important, however, that a renewed 
industrial strategy recognises all of these diverse goals 
and can be translated into a concrete, actionable plan at 
the EU level, with a clear governance structure. 
This Issue Paper argues that in renewing its industrial 
strategy, the EU should put in place an ‘Industry Action 
Plan’, complete with new policy tools and concrete 
industrial initiatives. Beyond mainstreaming industrial 
competitiveness across policy areas, an Action Plan 
should provide a more holistic and policy-oriented 
approach, with a vision towards 2030 that focuses on 
competitiveness, sustainability and strategic autonomy. 
Firstly, to ensure that the European industry remains 
competitive, the EU should aim to play a stronger role 
in global value chains, with a higher value-added. 
Secondly, the EU must create the conditions for the 
European industry, as well as the products and services 
it provides, to become sustainable and thus contribute 
to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals and 
climate-neutrality in alignment with the United Nation’s 
Paris Agreement. European industry should become 
fully climate-neutral by 2050 and seize the opportunity 
to become a global leader in sustainable and circular 
business models. Finally, an Industry Action Plan should 
contribute to achieving greater strategic autonomy for 
Europe by better responding to distorted competition 
and levering market power, and moving towards more 
technological sovereignty. Europe should mobilise all 
the tools at its disposal to become a global leader in 
developing digital technologies that address the societal, 
environmental and health challenges of today. 
This Paper includes a list of recommendations centred 
around five policy strands: (1) making the Single Market 
(including competition policy) work, (2) improving 
innovation policy and achieving technological 
sovereignty, (3) acting strategically and enforcing 
reciprocity, (4) ensuring a fair and inclusive industrial 
transition, and (5) climate-proofing industry with a 2050 
climate neutrality roadmap.
7Introduction
“To help drive the change we need, I will put 
forward my plan for a future-ready economy,  
our new industrial strategy.”1 
Ursula von der Leyen
In a fast-changing world, a solid industrial base remains 
crucial for Europe to take on the many challenges 
it currently faces. Industry2 is one of the largest 
employers in Europe, accounts for most EU exports 
and provides the majority of investments in research 
and development (R&D). Manufacturing industries 
increasingly buy, produce and sell services, and it is 
estimated that one additional job in manufacturing 
can create 0.5 to 2 jobs in other sectors.3 Industry is 
therefore essential to secure future jobs, growth and 
innovation and develop new technologies. It also plays 
a central role in assuring transition towards a more 
sustainable, circular and climate-friendly economy. The 
goal of attaining a climate-neutral Europe by 2050, as 
proposed by the European Commission,4 will not be met 
unless industry is involved. 
However, industry in Europe is faced with unprecedented 
new challenges and megatrends,5 from a slowdown in 
global trade to digital disruption and climate change. 
Some have come to the fore in recent months, while 
others have been present for several years. 
Global competition is increasingly fierce, and Europe’s 
competitors do not shy away from adopting more 
aggressive industrial strategies or protectionism, 
subsidising and shielding their own national industries. 
Europe’s open and competitive Single Market represents 
the greatest added value for industry to flourish. 
However, while Europe has opened up much of its 
market to the rest of the world, European industry 
rarely enjoys equal market access to third countries.6 
Some countries, such as China, are even increasingly 
closing off further market segments to bolster their own 
companies and become ‘self-sufficient’.
Industry in Europe is faced with 
unprecedented new challenges  
and megatrends.
Furthermore, the technologies of the future are, to a 
greater extent developed outside Europe, and industries 
in Europe are becoming more dependent on high-tech 
and raw materials from a limited number of suppliers in 
third countries.7 While this dependence places European 
industry at a competitive disadvantage, it also poses a 
challenge to the EU’s ‘strategic autonomy’; meaning 
Europe’s “ability to set objectives and mobilise the 
necessary resources in ways that do not primarily depend 
on the decisions and assets of others”.8 Being dependent 
on external resources, innovation and technological 
solutions weakens the EU’s standing in global 
negotiations, making it more of a follower than a leader 
in shaping international rules and standards, and more 
vulnerable to cyber threats. Such elements are crucial  
for achieving ‘technological sovereignty’, as called for  
by European Commission President-elect Ursula  
von der Leyen’s political guidelines for 2019-2024, and 
some of the mission letters to future Commissioners.9
There is a growing internal push to  
achieve a climate-neutral EU by 2050, 
which can only be delivered if supported  
by the industry.
At the same time, climate change and environmental 
challenges are trends that pose direct challenges to the 
industry, increasing uncertainty around the availability 
and pricing of energy and materials, for example. 
Climate change and global commitments stemming 
from the Paris Agreement10 and the United Nation’s 
(UN) Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)11 create 
additional pressure, as they require active contributions 
from the industry in the form of more sustainable 
processes, products and services, which implies 
profound industrial transformations. There is a growing 
internal push to achieve a climate-neutral EU by 2050, 
which can only be delivered if supported by the industry. 
Delivering on these commitments would create winners 
and losers and potentially short- and long-term losses. 
For an industry that recognises and adapts to these 
trends and provides market solutions to address the 
sustainability challenges, the possibilities can be great 
and are only growing, but they need the right conditions 
to prosper and benefit from a first-mover advantage.
A NEED FOR EU ACTION
Increasingly, the EU and its member states, both 
individually and collectively, have sought to develop 
strategies to meet these challenges. While the EU’s 
approach has traditionally focused on creating the 
necessary ecosystem for a more competitive Europe, the 
member states’ strategies underline the need to support 
and promote domestic industries. Although it makes 
perfect sense for national initiatives to support domestic 
industries, the aggregation of national measures can 
lead to further fragmentation of the Single Market and 
related EU policies in some cases.12 The multitude of 
national strategies that have emerged in recent years 
says as much about the magnitude of the megatrends 
currently facing industry as it does about the lack of a 
strong and efficient strategy at EU level.
8As many of the biggest challenges faced by European 
industry are global, the best way for the EU and its 
member states to support the industry is to coordinate 
their efforts and address the challenges together. 
Protecting one’s own national industry may not only 
be costly and ineffective but also risks undermining the 
EU policies (i.e. Single Market, competition, trade) that 
are fundamental to the competitiveness of European 
industry. A common EU approach would allow member 
states to respond to initiatives being developed by 
the EU’s main competitors (e.g. Made in China 2025, 
Belt and Road Initiative, America First), distorted 
competition and unfair trading practices. 
BUT WHAT KIND OF ACTION?
Despite the long debates and numerous calls for a 
European industrial policy, getting it off the ground has 
not been easy. Recent EU industrial strategies have been 
described as “inconsistent and weak”13 or equivalent to a 
“UFO: much discussed but impossible to describe”.14 Two 
elements make the formulation of a strong EU industrial 
strategy particularly challenging. Firstly, the fact that 
industrial policy is a “meta-policy”15 – stemming from 
a set of already established policies – implies that it 
requires a high level of coordination across a wide 
array of policies such as trade, competition, cohesion, 
education, R&D, climate, energy, innovation and digital 
policy.16 A high degree of coordination may be difficult 
to achieve at the EU level as competences in these areas 
lie alternatively with member states, the EU or both; and 
member states have diverging interests within them. 
Moreover, member states also have different views on 
what an EU industrial policy should do or aim for. 
Secondly, EU efforts have mostly focused on 
‘mainstreaming’ competitiveness across policy fields; 
few concrete policy tools and new initiatives have been 
launched. In recent years, progress has been made  
with the European Commission’s focus on concrete 
value chains, thus enabling better coordination and 
cross-cutting approaches across policy areas. However,  
the megatrends currently faced by European industry 
call for a more targeted and comprehensive EU 
industrial strategy.
The megatrends currently faced by 
European industry call for a more  
targeted and comprehensive EU  
industrial strategy.
This Issue Paper argues that in order to tackle the 
challenges and harness the opportunities, the EU 
requires an Industry Action Plan that would provide a 
more holistic and policy-oriented approach to restoring 
Europe’s industrial competitiveness. While “a systematic 
consideration of competitiveness concerns across all 
policy areas”17 will remain important, the EU needs 
to take a more active approach to provide European 
industry with the framework conditions to become 
competitive and sustainable in an ever-tumultuous 
world. In developing a new industrial strategy, the EU 
should build upon its strategic value chains approach 
as well as go further to set up a dedicated governance 
structure, introduce new policy tools and launch new 
industrial initiatives. 
OUTLINE
This Paper is divided into four chapters. Chapter 1 
provides a short state-of-play of Europe’s economy and 
industry and describes some of the major challenges  
and megatrends the EU industry is currently facing. 
Chapter 2 assesses Europe’s efforts to deal with said 
challenges and opportunities, singling out some of the 
EU’s main strengths and weaknesses. Chapter 3 offers 
a vision and priorities for an Industry Action Plan for 
the EU, as well as how it should be shaped. Chapter 4 
highlights some major recommendations for a more 
sustainable, competitive and strategically autonomous 
EU industry.
Chapter 1: European industry today
1.   A SHORT STATE-OF-PLAY: EU ECONOMY 
AND INDUSTRY
The EU, which in the early 2000s was the world’s largest 
economic block in absolute terms, has in the last decade 
been overtaken by the US. Additionally, its relative share 
of the world’s GDP has been declining, and the world’s 
economic centre is gradually moving eastwards. China’s 
share of the global economy in purchasing power parity 
(PPP) was less than 10% in 2005, but it more than doubled 
to reach 20%, the largest in the world today. Between 
2005 and 2020, the Chinese economy grew by more than 
sixfold (see Figure 1).
The consequences of the 2008 economic crisis were felt 
more strongly and for longer in Europe than in the rest 
of the world. After a double-dip recession, the EU has 
been sustaining moderate levels of economic growth 
since 2014, with real GDP growing at a yearly rate of 
around 2%.19 The crisis also had other impacts, including 
on the levels of unemployment and investment. The 
unemployment rate in the EU peaked at a remarkable 11% 
in 2013 (though it was above 26% in Greece and Spain) 
and has been steadily recovering since, reaching 6.8% in 
2018, which is even below the 2007, pre-crisis level. The 
employment rate is at an all-time high of over 73% of the 
EU population (18 to 65 years old), which is not far from 
the 2020 target of 75%.20
There is a high level of heterogeneity 
within the EU.
There is a high level of heterogeneity within the EU. Its 
28 member states and their respective regions differ 
greatly. Starting from the simplest economic indicator, 
GDP per capita, a dividing line between member states 
in the northwest and those in southeast becomes 
apparent. While the average GDP per capita in purchasing 
power standards (PPS) of the EU is around €30,000, the 
Netherlands, Austria, Denmark and Germany (around 
€39,000) are twice as rich as Romania, Croatia and 
Bulgaria (under €20,000).21 However, since member states 
with a lower GDP per capita tend to grow at faster rates 
(around 5% in Poland, Hungary and Latvia in 2018), there 
is an overall degree of economic convergence, although 
arguably at a less-than-desirable pace.22 However, it must 
be noted that just as the EU aggregate hides differences 
between member states, national figures also conceal the 
high degree of diversity between its regions. It appears 
that some relatively poor regions, especially in Southern 
Europe, show very low growth rates, thus going against 
the overall pattern of convergence. 
Europe has not been exempt from 
deindustrialisation.
Another consequence of the crisis was the drop in the 
investment level, which is yet to reach the 2007 peak 
of 23% of EU GDP – although it has been growing for 
several consecutive years.23 It must be considered that 
investment as a percentage of GDP has been consistently 
9
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lower in the EU than in the US, Japan and South Korea 
since the 1990s.24 The recovery of productivity growth is 
taking place, but at a slower pace than before the crisis. In 
fact, productivity growth has been stagnating for several 
years and has only recently picked up, especially in the 
euro area. Conversely, the US performance is markedly 
higher. Similarly, labour productivity in the US and Japan 
has exceeded that of the EU, both before and after the 
crisis.25 The European economy’s ability to increase its 
total factor productivity (TFP) and as such improve how 
efficiently it uses factors of production is thus lower than 
in the US, suggesting that there is untapped potential for 
further GDP growth.
While industry has been one of the main sectors affected 
by the crisis, it has also been a source of resilience, 
innovation and social stability in subsequent years. Despite 
representing a smaller share of the EU economy over time, 
manufacturing accounted for half of the EU’s productivity 
growth and its value-added growth post-crisis.26 Overall, EU 
industry currently provides for more than 52 million jobs 
(directly and indirectly), represents over 80% of European 
exports and, crucially, around 65% of investments in R&D in 
Europe.27 Hence the recurring mantra that industry remains 
the backbone of Europe’s economy.
As in other developed countries, however, Europe has not 
been exempt from deindustrialisation.28 The contribution 
of manufacturing to EU GDP dropped from 18.5% in 
2000 to 15% in 2012, and the industry share of EU gross 
value added (GVA)29 decreased from 22% in 2000 to 19% 
in 2016.30 Globalisation, the offshoring of manufacturing 
jobs and the rise of services have contributed to this 
trend. Today, the EU’s economic structure is increasingly 
dominated by services. In 2017, services accounted for 
more than 70% of both GVA and employment, and have 
Source: Dijkstra (2017)33
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since grown in their relative share of the economy. 
The fastest-growing sector is ICT, whose value-added 
increased by 80% between 2000 and 2015 in the EU, and 
by more than 100% in the US.31
Within the EU, the share of industry in the economy 
varies across member states and regions. Less developed 
regions tend to be more industry-intensive than the rest 
(see Figure 2). Industrial GVA in less developed regions 
has been steadily increasing since 1996 (except for during 
the crisis), while it has been declining in all the other 
regions. Industry accounts for over 36% of GVA in Ireland, 
32% in Czechia, 27% in Slovenia and Hungary, 26.5% in 
Poland, and 26% in Germany and Romania (see Figure 3). 
At the same time, it accounts for less than 15% in France, 
the UK, Greece and Malta; and less than 10% in Cyprus 
and Luxembourg.32
As assessed in the next part, EU industry is currently 
being impacted by major transformations: a slowdown in 
global trade and a rise in protectionism, the emergence of 
new technologies, the development of global value chains 
(GVCs), the need for industry to become more sustainable 
and emission-free, and increased competition for human 
and natural resources. These constitute some of the 
main drivers for industrial transformations and must be 
addressed effectively by an EU industrial strategy. 
2.   DRIVERS FOR CHANGE: MEGATRENDS  
AND INDUSTRY
A.   Industry facing a slowdown in trade and a rise  
in protectionism
A slowdown in global trade
European industry muddles through an ever more 
challenging trade environment for the goods and services 
it generates. Over the last decade, trade integration has 
slowed down worldwide: while the period between 1990 
and 2008 might be remembered as a ‘golden age’ with 
the trade in goods and services rising from 39% to 61% 
of global GDP,37 global trade fell sharply following the 
financial and economic crisis in 2008. 
Over the last decade, trade integration  
has slowed down worldwide.
Global trade is picking up gradually and currently 
represents 58% of global GDP.38 Still, the last decade 
did not see global trade and trade integration develop 
at the same pace as in the two previous decades. In 
its latest “Economic Outlook”, the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has 
identified the current slowdown of trade and growing 
trade uncertainty as the main reason for the weakening 
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INFOBOX 1: Future trends put 
some EU regions more at risk 
than others 
Globalisation and technological 
change exert different impacts onto 
the EU’s many regions and member 
states, in relation to their economic 
structure and local attributes. Those 
characterised by relatively high 
industrial unit labour cost (ULC), 
relatively large employment in  
low-tech manufacturing, relatively 
low educational attainment level 
and a decrease in employment in 
industry are considered more at  
risk (see Figure 4, in darker colour).  
A clear geographical pattern 
emerges, as regions in Southern 
and Eastern Europe are more at 
risk than others, though France and 
Denmark are exceptions. 
of global growth. The OECD projects that global trade is 
to grow by only 2% in 2019, the lowest rate in a decade. 
This will inevitably impact global growth. The world’s 
GDP grew by 3.5% in 2018, but the projections for 2019 
(3.2%) and 2020 (3.4%) have been revised downwards39 
(see Figure 5).
A multilateral trading system in crisis 
Even more concerning, however, is the fact that the 
multilateral trading system, which enabled the initial 
rise in global trade and growth, is now in crisis. The 
World Trade Organization (WTO) is facing significant 
difficulties in advancing its negotiation agenda, 
updating and modernising its rulebook, and ensuring the 
well-functioning of its dispute settlement mechanisms. 
Today, the multilateral trading system seems 
increasingly incapable of doing what it was initially set 
up for: combating tariffs and trade restrictions.
The negotiation agenda of the WTO has now been stuck 
for almost 20 years, with little or no progress within 
the Doha Development Round.41 Disagreements that 
have existed for years within the WTO – between North 
and South, East and West; and between developed 
and developing countries (on e.g. agriculture, services, 
procurement, rules of origin) – have now been 
compounded by US disengagement.42 Not only has the 
multilateral trading system lost one of its most ardent 
supporters and driving forces, but the present Trump 
administration has also undermined the WTO by blocking 
appointments to its highest dispute settlement body, the 
Appellate Body.43
The multilateral trading system, which 
enabled the initial rise in global trade and 
growth, is now in crisis.
If the current stalemate continues, the Appellate Body is 
expected to have less than three members, the minimum 
number required to hear an appeal, by December 2019. 
The breakdown of the Appellate Body would significantly 
reduce the attractiveness of multilateral trading system in 
settling disputes, leading to further trade uncertainty and 
countries eventually imposing additional tariffs and trade 
restrictions, without worrying about cases being brought 
to the WTO.
12
Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2019a)40
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A rise in tariffs and protectionism
In recent years, policymakers have become increasingly 
willing to make use of tariffs and protectionism to 
protect or promote national industry. Both tariffs and 
non-tariff measures – think export subsidies, restrictions 
on foreign direct investments (FDIs), domestic clauses 
in public procurement (PP) – have increased steadily, 
limiting access to foreign markets.44 The number of new 
trade restrictions announced by G20 economies has risen 
sharply since 2012, and peaked in 2018 (see Figure 6). 
Anti-dumping measures and import tariffs accounted 
for 30% of all measures imposed.45 The use of indirect 
tools (e.g. state loans) for exporting companies has 
also increased over time.46 In Europe, manufacturing 
and especially the automobile, information and 
communications technology (ICT), electronics, chemicals 
and textile industries are among the most impacted by 
the rise in tariffs and protectionism.47
US tariffs and America First
Throughout 2018, the US administration adopted a wide 
range of tariffs on imported goods on the grounds of 
‘national security’ and in support of its own industry.49 These 
tariffs, adopted under the banner of their America First 
policy, have included tariffs on solar panels and washing 
machines (20% to 50%), later followed by tariffs on steel 
(25%) and aluminium (10%), which have led to several 
retaliatory measures, including from the EU.50 Further tariffs 
were also set on a wide range of goods (25%) imported 
from China. The US administration has (until now) delayed 
deciding on whether to impose tariffs on automobiles and 
auto parts, including those from the EU, amid allegations 
that they pose a “national security threat”.51
These tariffs are estimated to impact €6.4 billion worth 
of EU goods, mostly in manufacturing.52 The ensuing 
escalation of retaliatory measures also directly affects 
European companies integrated into GVCs and  
one-third of EU companies operating in China.53 Additional 
US tariffs on cars would also have a substantial effect on 
European industry. Germany, for example, could see its 
global car exports cut by 7.7% (equivalent to €18.4 billion) 
and its car exports to the US halved in the long term.54 
In recent months, rising US-China trade tensions have 
intensified the pressure on EU manufacturing economies 
and are seen as the main reason for the recent economic 
contraction in some EU member states.55
The EU and the US have agreed to work together towards 
“zero tariffs, zero non-tariff barriers, and zero subsidies 
on non-auto industrial goods”,56 thus avoiding additional 
tariffs while trade talks are ongoing. Future trade 
negotiations may be difficult given the US’ express call 
to include agriculture in the negotiations, and the EU’s 
consecutive opposition.57 The US administration has even 
alluded that additional tariffs could be imposed if the EU 
does not accept their proposition.58
Trade barriers and Made in China 2025
The most recent Trade and Investment Barriers Report 
by the European Commission concludes that European 
industry currently faces a record number (425) of active 
trade and investment barriers in 59 third countries.59 
Interestingly, for the first time, China is topping the list 
of recorded barriers, followed by Russia, India, Indonesia 
and the US. The Commission also estimates that the new 
barriers recorded in China in 2018 have a significantly 
larger impact (€25.7 billion) than the restrictions imposed 
by any other trade partner (see Figure 7).60
This significant increase in trade barriers in China is 
mostly explained by new restrictions within the ICT sector 
and on high-tech industries, several of which have been 
implemented under the banner of Made in China 2025.62 
This strategy is an industrial programme aiming to make 
China a dominant player in ten industries: ICT, machines/
robots, space/aviation, maritime, railway, energy-saving 
vehicles, energy equipment, agricultural machines, new 
materials and biopharma/high-tech medical devices.63 
EU28 TRADE FLOWS AFFECTED BY PARTNER COUNTRIES’ 
NEW BARRIERS (€BN., 2018)
Source: European Commission (2019a)61
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Made in China 2025 is currently the most comprehensive 
and ambitious initiative undertaken by any country to 
protect and promote its own industry. It is a top-down 
strategy aiming to make Chinese high-tech industry 
more competitive within and outside of China.64 In doing 
so, China does not shy away from using protectionist 
instruments. In combination with earlier restrictions, 
foreign industry now faces a wide range of challenges 
when exporting to China, including massive subsidisation 
of Chinese firms, forced technology transfers, unjustified 
standards and obligations.65 European countries with 
an important high-tech sector and dependence on 
manufacturing (i.e. Germany, Czechia, Hungary, Ireland, 
Slovakia, Austria, Romania, Slovenia) will be highly 
exposed to competition from Made in China 202566  
(see Figure 8).
The European Commission concludes that 
European industry currently faces a record 
number of active trade and investment 
barriers in 59 third countries.
Since its launch, Made in China 2025 has allowed for 
the substitution of foreign technology with Chinese 
technology.68 Chinese authorities have set detailed targets 
for various sectors, including “basic core components and 
important basic materials” to be produced by up to 70% 
of Chinese suppliers, 80% for new energy vehicles and 
renewable energy equipment, 70% for industrial robots 
and medical devices and 40% for mobile phone chips.69 
The sharp criticism levelled against the Chinese approach 
has led to the country toning down its reference to the 
strategy in official statements and media coverage – but 
this is merely a rhetorical concession.70
Made in China 2025 is currently the most 
comprehensive and ambitious initiative 
undertaken by any country to protect and 
promote its own industry.
Highly exposed manufacturing goods and Brexit
On top of the major challenges stemming from the US 
and China, the UK’s withdrawal from the EU (i.e. Brexit) 
is also expected to represent an important slowdown 
in trade for industry. Once Brexit takes place, the UK is 
expected to leave the Single Market (provided that no 
agreement on this is found) and EU27-UK value chains 
will be disrupted, to the detriment of both UK and EU 
firms. The projections of a ‘hard Brexit’ on UK GDP loss 
varies between 2% and 10%, while it varies between 
1% and 2% for EU member states.71 Projections are a 
little less negative – but still considerable – in the case 
of a ‘soft Brexit’, with a negotiated comprehensive free 
trade agreement (FTA) or the UK remaining within 
the European Economic Area (EEA). While wholesale 
trade in the UK is to be impacted the hardest by Brexit, 
manufacturing goods are expected to lose out the most 
amongst the EU27. For a country such as Germany, 
some of the main sectors exposed are cars, machinery, 
pharmaceutical products, chemicals, and food and 
beverages.72 For Belgium, highly exposed sectors are food 
and beverages, textiles, pharmaceuticals and chemicals.73
Brexit is expected to represent an 
important slowdown in trade for industry.
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Growing trade challenges within Europe
In addition to the resurgence of trade barriers worldwide, 
European industry must also face growing limitations 
within the Single Market to trading within Europe. New 
barriers often take the form of national or even regional 
measures adopted on the grounds of public safety, 
environmental or health concerns, and which sometimes 
result in ‘gold-plating’ (e.g. technical requirements, 
requests for additional documentation, testing). Even 
if disproportionate and discriminatory, such barriers 
do not always take place on a large enough scale to be 
picked up by the European Commission for infringement 
proceedings. They can nevertheless represent significant 
barriers for businesses and may, in some cases, even 
dissuade them from entering new markets.74
European industry must face growing 
limitations within the Single Market to 
trading within Europe.
Moreover, even certain EU policies and approaches could 
be considered to undermine its calls for free and open 
trade. It should be recognised that although its import 
tariffs for industrial products are among the lowest in 
the world, the EU has been criticised for remaining too 
protective, especially of its food and agricultural market. 
Certain elements of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) have been criticised both within and outside of 
Europe for creating distorted competition and hindering 
a level playing field within Europe.75 Arguably, some 
interventions within the CAP (especially direct payments) 
are not necessarily conducted in the public interest or 
justifiable on environmental grounds.76 Direct payments to 
the agricultural sector can create impediments to the EU’s 
own ambition to open up world trade (e.g. current trade 
negotiations with the US, challenges with Mercosur), and 
may still add distortions on world markets.77
B.   Digital technologies transforming industry
There is little doubt that recent developments in 
new technologies and digital solutions are radically 
transforming industry. Digital advances in artificial 
intelligence (AI), robotics, the Internet of Things (IoT), 
blockchain, big data, fifth-generation cellular network 
technology (5G), 3D printing, nanotechnology and 
biotechnology – to mention just a few – are allowing 
for more interconnectedness in manufacturing, more 
efficiency in processes and new products and services 
to emerge. The degree to which industries are impacted 
and transformed by these developments varies across 
sectors and countries. Understandably, different terms are 
therefore employed in describing them, from ‘disruption’ 
and ‘revolution’ to ‘change’ and ‘transformation’.78 Still, 
all industrial sectors and even the most remote regions 
will be impacted in one way or another. The use of terms 
such as the ‘fourth industrial revolution’ or ‘industry 4.0’ 
reflects the magnitude of change that is expected.79
Automation potential across the industries
In terms of both workforce and competitiveness, industry 
is one of the economic sectors that will be most impacted 
by automation brought about by new technologies. 
Manufacturing, transport and warehouses are estimated 
to have an automation potential of 60%, of 51% of jobs 
in the mining industry and 47% in the construction 
sector.80 Meanwhile, sectors such as education (27%), 
management (35%) and arts and entertainment (41%) 
have a lower degree of automation potential. ‘Physical’ 
and ‘predictable’ work81 could be more easily automated 
than ‘managerial’ and ‘unpredictable’ tasks82 (see Figure 
9, page 16). However, with the evolution of deep learning 
and machine learning, the potential of AI performing 
more ‘unpredictable’ tasks will also rise.
Industry is one of the economic sectors 
that will be most impacted by automation 
brought about by new technologies.
Increased productivity…
While the automation of work has been around for 
some time, recent developments in robotics and AI 
have enabled the automation of decision-making and 
cognitive processes that until recently were considered 
only possible for humans. With the development of big 
data, algorithms are increasingly replicating human 
decision-making processes, especially on the factory 
floor. According to estimates by the McKinsey Global 
Institute, robotics, AI and automation could raise 
global productivity growth by 0.8% to 1.4% annually.84 
For highly industrial countries (e.g. Germany), a more 
digitised industry is estimated to contribute an additional 
revenue growth of about €30 billion per year and create as 
many as 960,000 new jobs.85
CASE STUDY 1: Automation in the German  
automobile industry 
The automobile industry is already one of the most impacted 
by new technologies and automation.86 Germany’s car industry 
is planning to increase the deployment of digital technologies 
even further, to become more competitive with rising Asian 
firms and cope with an ageing workforce. German car companies 
were among the first to introduce advanced robots in its 
factories, since the early 2000s. Audi has introduced a robot 
into its Neckarsulm production facility which hands coolant 
expansion tanks to line workers. Other companies such as 
Volkswagen, Mercedes-Benz and Opel employ ‘helper robots’ 
that assist car assembly.87 Despite the fear that automation will 
eliminate thousands of jobs, the automobile industry workforce 
in Germany expanded by 14% (i.e. 710,000 jobs) between 2010 
and 2015.88
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…and new jobs
At the same time, new technologies are also expected to 
create new jobs within industry. Most studies highlight 
that while less than 5% of all jobs could be entirely 
automated, about 60% of jobs could be automated up to 
47%.89 So while most jobs are expected to change with 
digitisation, few are expected to disappear in the near 
future completely. New jobs will appear, focusing on the 
interaction between humans and machines. Given the 
current fear that new technologies will massively destroy 
jobs, it is worth remembering that for advanced industrial 
countries like the US, one-third of new jobs created in the 
last 25 years was unheard of before 2005.90
In the short- and medium term, up to seven million 
new jobs within ICT and linked to digital skills could be 
added to the European economy in the years to come.91 
Amongst others, these could include cybersecurity 
experts, big data analysts, hardware manufacturers, app 
creator and coders. While some jobs could be created 
in direct relation to ICT and digitalisation, others 
could result from the growth and boost in productivity 
triggered by these new technologies (e.g. within the 
service sector). Moreover, technologies such as AI may 
also introduce completely new types of jobs that may 
be difficult to apprehend for the time being. A list of 
such jobs has been supplied by the MIT Sloan School 
of Management and includes examples such as ‘ethics 
compliance manager’, ‘AI trainer’, ‘transparency analyst’, 
‘AI usefulness strategist’, ‘automation economist’ and 
‘machine relations manager’.92
In the EU, professionals and technicians are expected 
to become the largest occupational forces by 2025 
(both above 15% of total employment), while the share 
of clerks and craft workers will be significantly lower 
than in 2003.93 Although it is clear that the workforce 
needs new skills, education and training of the working 
population remains minimal and has not increased in the 
past decade: only 10% of low-skilled and around 15% of 
medium-skilled workers participate in lifelong learning.94
TECHNICAL POTENTIAL FOR AUTOMATION ACROSS SECTORS, DEPENDING ON MIX OF ACTIVITY TYPES, 
IN THE US ECONOMY: PREDICTABLE AND PHYSICAL IS MORE LIKELY TO BE AFFECTED BY AUTOMATION (2017)
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The former division between 
manufacturing and services has  
lost relevance as they have become  
a joint production.
Blurred lines: Manufacturing and services
Digitisation has also reinforced the servicification of 
manufacturing, meaning that manufacturing and services 
are increasingly intertwined. The degree to which 
manufacturing buys, produces, sells, and exports services 
has grown exponentially. Since the beginning of the 
century, industry has been investing more in ‘intangible 
assets’ (e.g. software, data, business models, organisational 
innovation) and high-level services (e.g. branding, design, 
technology) than in machinery, hardware or property.96 
Therefore, in many ways, the former division between 
manufacturing and services has lost relevance as they have 
become a joint production; a combined sector representing 
24.3% of value-added in the European economy, and 20.8% 
on average for the rest of the world.97
Digitalisation and digital technologies will 
not automatically lead to more sustainable 
production and consumption.
Unintended consequences
Technological progress and the transition to the 
knowledge economy also have the potential to increase 
job polarisation and wage inequality further. In the years 
between 2002 and 2016, most EU countries witnessed 
a reduction in their share of middle-income jobs by 
at least 10%, while jobs at the two ends of the wage 
distribution have been growing.98 As industry becomes 
more technology-intensive, demand for skilled workers 
will increase, thus raising their wage level. Consequently, 
middle-skilled workers increasingly have to retrain and 
gain new skills or face being forced into low-skill jobs. 
Additionally, workers earning a low income are more 
exposed to the risks of automation (see Figure 10). The 
OECD estimated that 20% of low-income workers are at 
high risk of automation, while the same is true for 15% 
of middle-income and 10% of high-income workers. In 
Greece, Spain, Slovenia and Slovakia, around 30% or more 
low-income workers are at high risk of automation.99 
These trends suggest a likely increase in wage inequality. 
Moreover, digitalisation and digital technologies will not 
automatically lead to more sustainable production and 
consumption. In fact, digitalisation could very well lead 
to the opposite if not guided and governed well. There is a 
risk that new digital technologies may result in unwanted 
consequences, such as overdrive of the linear ‘take-make-
CASE STUDY 2: 3D printing in manufacturing – 
Bringing jobs back home 
The Futurecraft 4D is a new 3D printed shoe developed by 
Adidas and the manufacturing company Carbon. 3D printed 
footwear requires fewer materials – some of which are 
recyclable – and is more durable. Carbon’s 3D technology speeds 
up the production process significantly: 20 minutes per shoe 
or up to 100 times faster than other additive manufacturing 
techniques. In recent years, 3D printing technology has allowed 
Adidas to establish two so-called ‘speed factories’ (i.e. digitised 
factories with a small but skilled workforce) in Germany and 
the US, de facto delocalising factory jobs from Vietnam back 
to Europe.95 These new factories allow for more personalised 
products, moving away from mass production which usually 
takes place in third countries like China, Indonesia and Vietnam. 
Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2019a)101 
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dispose’ economy or increased emissions. However, if 
adequately steered, digitalisation could certainly help boost 
the transition to a circular economy by improving processes, 
enabling new sustainable business models and helping 
industry to be smarter with their use of resources.100
The capacity of a given industry to 
integrate itself into different segments  
of global value chains has become crucial 
for competitiveness.
C.   Industry increasingly reliant on global value 
chains and innovation
The advances in new technologies and the trade 
liberalisation described above have led to the 
development of integrated and highly innovative 
industrial value chains. In recent years, these value 
chains have become one of the main characteristics of 
competitive industries. In simple terms, a GVC can be 
defined as the chain of all the activities and inputs that go 
into the creation of final good or service.102 By lowering 
the cost of moving knowledge, goods and services, digital 
technologies have enabled firms to establish a vast 
amount of international production networks, leading 
to what some have called a new “global value chain 
revolution”.103 Globally, the capacity of a given industry 
to integrate itself into different segments of GVCs, and 
especially within high-value segments, has become 
crucial for competitiveness.
GVCs are characterised by increased specialisation, as 
cross-border trade is comprised of intermediate products 
(i.e. parts and components, raw and processed materials) 
by up to 80%, significantly outnumbering final or fully 
assembled products.104 Assembly lines and production 
methods are therefore more fragmented, with production 
processes taking place across several countries. A good 
example of such a value chain can be seen in Figure 11, 
indicating where different parts of wind turbines are 
made in Europe. Meanwhile, Figure 12 shows the global 
supply chain needed to assemble a Mini car, as currently 
produced by the BMW Group.105
Global value chains vary across industries (see Figure 13)
Highly innovative industries such as automobile, computer 
and electronics, pharmaceuticals and chemicals 
constitute the most valuable and trade-intensive 
value chains.109 Most trade within these value chains 
is done with intermediate goods, and investments into 
R&D remain crucial as competition is mostly based 
on innovation and quality. Participation is highly 
concentrated around a small number of advanced 
economies (12 countries represent 75% of global 
exports),110 within which China’s presence is rising.111
Industries reliant on regional processing (of e.g. food, 
beverage, paper, glass, cement, plastics) use fewer 
intermediate goods than other GVCs. They are mostly 
traded within regional value chains and, to a lesser 
extent, across GVCs due to factors such as varying 
consumer preferences and the weight or perishability of 
the traded goods.112 While production is still spread across 
the world and most trade is done at intraregional level,113 
regional value chains are growing faster than those for 
innovative and/or labour-intensive industries. 
Industries reliant on regional processing (of e.g. food, 
beverage, paper, glass, cement, plastics) use fewer 
intermediate goods than other GVCs. They are mostly 
traded within regional value chains and, to a lesser 
extent, across GVCs due to factors like varying consumer 
preferences and the weight or perishability of the traded 
goods.114 While production is still spread across the 
world and most trade is done at the intraregional level,115 
regional value chains are growing faster than those for 
innovative and/or labour-intensive industries. 
Industries centred on resource-intensive goods (e.g. 
mining, agriculture, basic metals, energy) generate 
 Fig. 11 
 Fig. 12 
Source: European Commission (2018d)106
Source: Unsöld (2018)107
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almost as much gross output as highly innovative and/
or labour-intensive industries. Most of these outputs 
are intermediate goods that are redirected towards 
other value chains. 19 countries spread across the world 
account for 75% of export within this value chain.116
Finally, labour-intensive services (e.g. wholesale, retail, 
transport, storage) and knowledge-intensive services 
(e.g. financial services, IT services, professional services) 
have a lower trade intensity across GVCs than goods-
producing industries. Services, in general, are less easily 
tradeable across borders due to their intangible nature 
and regulatory barriers. Still, activities in services (e.g. 
transport, storage, retail) have also increased following 
the rise of cross-border trade in goods and e-commerce. 
Labour-intensive services (especially wholesale and retail) 
now represent the second-largest job creator worldwide.117 
Knowledge-intensive services depend on skilled labour and 
five countries – the US, UK, Republic of Ireland, Germany, 
France – make up 46% of global exports. 
Advanced economies are facing growing 
competition from China within highly 
innovative value chains.
Transformations of global value chains
Worldwide, industry and especially manufacturing are 
increasingly becoming reliant on GVCs. Goods-producing 
industries are more integrated into GVCs than services-
providing ones. In recent years, however, trade in services 
has grown to a greater extent than that for goods. In the 
last decade, trade in IT services, professional services and 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) have grown almost 
three times faster than trade in goods.118
GVCs have expanded into developing countries, and 
manufacturing jobs disappearing from more advanced 
economies: about a 39% loss in the UK, 24% in France and 
23% in the US since 1997. Notably, however, only 3% in 
Germany.119 Conversely, industries specialised in regional 
processing have been better protected from the rise in 
competition from developing countries. Trade is more 
regional than global in these value chains, and EU firms 
crucially benefit from the Single Market.
Source: Lund            (2019)108
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CASE STUDY 3: Spain’s success story
Over the years, Spain has specialised its food industry through 
regional, intra-EU value chains, and is more shielded from 
global competition than before. Spain’s food exports increased 
by 80% in the last decade, and the country is currently the first 
exporter of fresh fruit and vegetables globally.120
20
On the one hand, automation and rising wages in 
developing countries may lead to the creation and 
relocation of manufacturing jobs back to advanced 
economies. Automation would make labour costs 
less relevant for firms with regard to determining 
where to locate their production. On the other hand, 
advanced economies are facing growing competition 
from China within highly innovative value chains. 
China is becoming less reliant on intermediary goods 
and services from advanced economies, and its Made 
in China 2025 strategy aims to reduce its dependence 
further. China strongly supports its technological 
industry in AI, 5G and smart robotics, and is already a 
world leader in industrial robotics.121
The importance of innovating within global value chains
Many EU companies have traditionally positioned 
themselves on the high added-value end of GVCs. 
In an increasingly competitive and fast-changing 
environment, innovation is crucial to maintain their 
position and comparative advantage. In this case, 
innovation should be understood as being beyond 
technological development, to also encompass the 
adoption of new business models, market sophistication 
and institutional stability. This includes extensive 
investment in human capital and skill training; 
innovative infrastructure; a sound IPR and patent 
framework to reward innovative efforts; and attracting 
FDIs. For manufacturing activities, this means 
innovating the methods of production, moving away 
from traditional schemes, and embracing the link with 
services and knowledge-intensive activities.
In terms of innovation framework, 
European countries continue to rank 
among the strongest in the world.
In terms of innovation framework, European countries 
continue to rank among the strongest in the world. The 
Global Innovation Index 2019, published by the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), ranks six EU 
member states (i.e. Sweden, the Netherlands, the UK, 
Finland, Denmark, Germany) among the top ten most 
innovative economies. Ireland, France and Luxembourg 
also rank among the top 20. Although the US, China 
and Japan outperform EU countries in terms of public 
and private R&D expenditures, European countries 
score among the highest on several indexes: institutions 
(political, regulatory and business environment), human 
capital and research, business sophistication, and 
knowledge and technology outputs.122
D.   The need for a sustainable industry
Climate change is arguably the greatest global challenge 
of our time. The science is clear: human activities have 
led to the emission of greenhouse gases (GHG) that are 
warming our planet and, as a result, are destabilising 
life on earth.123 The world is not on track to limit global 
warming – on the contrary, with the current trend, the 
global temperature is expected to increase 2°C by 2060, 
which could lead to unprecedented economic, societal 
and environmental costs. There is a growing recognition 
amidst politicians and citizens124 as well as within 
industry that the time for climate action is now. While 
addressing the climate crisis will require actions across 
economy, society and different sectors, industry will be 
a major player in accelerating the transition towards a 
climate-neutral and zero-emission economy.125
Climate change is arguably the greatest 
global challenge of our time. 
The global commitments stemming from the Paris 
Agreement126 and the UN’s SDGs127 provide a vision and 
a direction for measures to be taken. The Agreement sets 
the ambition of achieving a climate-neutral world by  
mid-century. The SDGs again define objectives for 
inclusive and sustainable industrialisation, and also 
responsible consumption and production, which all 
have direct implications for industry. These global 
commitments, together with consumers’ calls for more 
sustainable products and services, provide a strong sense 
of direction for industry.
Taking action is also in the interest of industry. For 
example, climate change-related catastrophes and 
disruptions can lead to substantial economic and 
societal costs as well as affect industry.128 Major risks 
include damage floods, wildfires, storms and droughts, 
as well as food and water shortages. Moreover, climate 
change can accelerate competition over natural 
resources. Scarcity of natural, non-renewable resources 
is already reflected in supply risks and volatility of 
prices. The total cumulative global cost of climate 
change by 2030 is estimated to be between $2 trillion 
and $4 trillion.129 The OECD projects that global GDP 
would be reduced by up to 10% if temperatures continue 
to rise to 4°C above pre-industrial levels.130
Many industries are adapting by 
developing more sustainable  
business models and contributing  
to a circular economy.
Moreover, there is a growing market for sustainable 
products and services not only in the EU but also 
beyond its borders, from China and India to Africa. 
Many industries are already adapting by, for example, 
developing more sustainable business models and 
contributing to a circular economy and reaping the 
related benefits. The clean economy is growing fast, and 
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the total number of people employed in the renewable 
energy industry is growing rapidly. 
Arguably, at the core of future-proofing any industry is a 
recognition of the sustainability challenges and aligning 
actions with the aforementioned global commitments. 
Only industry that adapts and reacts to these trends and 
commitments and brings solutions to the market can be 
expected to have long-term competitive prospects. 
Calls for climate neutrality and lower emissions 
Industry is directly affected by the global commitments 
that most countries around the world and all EU member 
states committed to in 2015 through the Paris Agreement. 
The Agreement set out the goal of maintaining the 
increase of the average global temperature to well below 
2°C, and even to pursue efforts to reduce it to 1.5°C. 
Realistically, if such a goal is to be achieved, a long-term 
objective should be to reach net-zero emissions by 2050. 
At the EU level, the Commission has called for an EU-wide 
2050 net-zero emissions target, with several EU member 
states having already defined national net-zero goals.131 
Within the European Council, close to all member states 
have already agreed to a 2050 net-zero target, barring 
Czechia, Hungary and Poland.132 To increase the ambition 
also in a medium-term, several member states, as well 
as incoming Commission President von der Leyen, have 
called for increasing the previously agreed GHG emission 
target from 40% to up 55% by 2030. The EU-wide 2050 
net-zero emissions target has also been endorsed by 
several environmental NGOs133 and industry.134 Overall, 
the strong focus on a new ‘European Green Deal’ and 
climate action, indicates the political priority given to the 
topic in the EU at the moment.
It is clear that achieving net-zero  
emissions by 2050 would require a deep 
economic transformation.
It is clear that achieving net-zero emissions by 2050 
would require a deep economic transformation, like 
a drastic GHG emission reduction across all sectors, 
especially in the highly polluting energy, building, 
transport, industry and agriculture sectors. The 
implications of these commitments and the scale of the 
challenge for policymakers, for the public and private 
sectors, as well as for citizens are significant.
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS BY SECTOR IN THE EU (CO2, T.)
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Industry emissions in the EU
In the EU, ‘industrial processes and product use’ 
represent around 8% of GHG emissions (see Figure 14, 
page 21). However, industry is also responsible, through 
related activities, for some of the emissions within ‘fuel 
combustion and fugitive emissions from fuels’ (54%) and 
the transport sector (25%).135 It is alarming that GHG 
emissions from ‘industrial processes and product use’ 
have not significantly reduced since 1990 (a mere 1% 
difference), while emissions from fuels and transport have 
dropped by 8 and 10 percentage points respectively. 
A closer look at energy-intensive industry (EII)137 
(producing e.g. steel, plastics, ammonia, cement), shows 
that it emits 500 million tonnes of carbon dioxide (CO2) 
per year. The sector accounts for 14% of the EU’s CO2 
emissions and 20% of global CO2 emissions.138 Efficiency 
gains and structural change towards a more services-
based economy contributed to reducing GHG emissions 
from European EII by 43% between 1990 and 2016. This is 
a trend that has been slowing down since 2010, however 
(see Figure 15, page 21).
It is worth noting that the European industry also has a 
climate and environmental footprint beyond its borders. 
For example, a study by the UN Environment Programme 
evaluates that extraction and processing account for half 
of the world’s carbon emissions and 90% of biodiversity 
loss.140 Also, if businesses move operations to countries 
with laxer emission constraints, for example, due to 
costs related to EU climate policies, this would lead to 
the risk of carbon leakage and thus a possible increase in 
industry’s total emissions. 
Industry’s climate action 
Many industries are committing to tackle climate 
change and promote decarbonisation via their own 
processes, products and services. Maersk, the world’s 
largest container shipping company, has declared that 
it aims to be carbon-neutral by 2050.141 The oil and gas 
company Shell has set a long-term ambition of reducing 
its net-carbon footprint and has linked these ambitions 
to the remuneration of its executives.142 Moreover, over 
a hundred major global firms spanning 23 countries (e.g. 
Electrolux, L’Oréal, Sony, McDonald’s) have committed 
to emission reduction targets through the Science Based 
Targets initiative, in cooperation with the UN Global 
Compact.143 Hundreds of companies have also committed 
to 100% renewable energy.144 Others have made voluntary 
commitments through the We Mean Business coalition.
The European industry has a climate  
and environmental footprint beyond  
its borders.
While the Trump administration announced its intention 
to withdraw from the Paris Agreement,145 over 1,700 US 
businesses and 200 US cities have signed up to the We 
Are Still In coalition and America’s Pledge, reaffirming 
their commitment to the Paris goals. Still, far from all 
companies have clear targets to reduce their emissions.146
Changing consumer preferences
In addition to global, national and local commitments, 
citizens themselves are showing increasing concern about 
the environment and climate by changing consumer 
preferences. Consumers are increasingly interested in 
sustainable products and services, supporting fair trade, 
and reducing food waste and/or energy consumption. 
Citizens are increasingly holding industry and politicians 
accountable on these grounds. 
In fact, according to studies conducted by the market 
research consultancy Nielsen, up to 81% of consumers 
worldwide strongly feel that companies should help 
improve the environment.147 15- to 20-year-old and 21- to 
34-year-old respondents agree (80% and 85% respectively) 
that it is “extremely or very important” that companies 
Source: Nielsen (2018a)148 
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implement programmes to improve the environment, 
while the same response varies between 65% and 79% 
for 35-year-old respondents and older. Consumers in 
emerging and developing countries feel especially strongly 
about issues such as air and water pollution, waste, water 
shortages and the use of pesticides, and more than half of 
all respondents feel “extremely or very concerned” about 
all these issues (see Figure 16). 
Such sentiments are gradually being reflected in 
consumption trends, as studies from the fashion industry 
and for other products increasingly show.149 Studies 
focusing on chocolate, coffee and bath products found 
that products with sustainability claims grew twice as 
fast in sales in comparison to others.150 The industry 
itself is also becoming aware of these changes, as 
several companies are already investing in and adopting 
more sustainable business models, goods and services. 
Examples include an increase of vegan options in 
food and beverages companies; packaging companies 
producing products that can be more easily recycled; 
and household and personal care businesses replacing 
petrochemicals, parabens and micro-plastics with 
biodegradable and natural ingredients.151 Still, companies 
could do more to respond to these demands.152
E.   Growing competition over human and natural 
resources
Competition over natural resources
Industries are facing growing, fierce competition for 
natural resources. Globalisation, the emergence of new 
economic players and demand for new technologies are 
increasing the race for limited available resources and 
spurring higher price volatility for primary products. 
The competition is growing evermore vigorous also due 
to the additional constraints on supply, such as climate 
change, water scarcity, political instability and conflicts 
that affect the availability of raw material stocks already 
facing depletion.153 Overexploitation of resources and 
environmental destruction are leading to resource scarcity, 
which can have far-reaching and unforeseeable economic, 
social, environmental and security implications. Thus, 
arguably, to ensure prosperity in the long term, there is 
a need to create a new kind of economy that decouples 
growth from resource use and impacts.154 It is becoming 
clear that the current ‘business as usual’ and ‘take, make 
and dispose’ economic model, which places an enormous 
strain on global resources (i.e. energy sources, water, land, 
food, minerals) is no longer sustainable. 
To ensure prosperity in the long term, 
there is a need to create a new kind of 
economy that decouples growth from 
resource use and impacts.
European industry is extremely vulnerable in the face 
of this global resource challenge. European companies 
outsource the largest share of resource extraction in the 
world. The EU is dependent on energy imports, such as 
oil and gas, from just a few suppliers (i.e. Russia), as well 
as raw materials for chemical, construction and other 
industrial sectors. 
Many of the industries that will be essential for creating 
a sustainable economy and that wish to benefit from 
digitalisation are dependent on raw materials from outside 
the EU. Rare earth, for example, is a key component for 
industrial goods (e.g. smartphones, windmills, electronic 
vehicles, robots, cybersecurity technology).155 E-mobility 
and information technology depend on rare earth, and 
batteries on lithium, cobalt and graphite. As Europe 
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currently produces only between 1% to 8% of the world’s 
cobalt, natural graphites, lithium and rare earth, critical 
raw materials represent a high-supply risk as they mostly 
originate from a limited number of countries and often lack 
substitutes (see Figure 17, page23). 
Europe is becoming a hub for innovative, 
digital solutions that accelerate the 
transition to a circular economy.
Many businesses already acknowledge that better use 
of resources would help to cut costs and thus improve 
competitiveness, so it follows that it is in the EU’s interest 
to be smarter with its domestic resources. The notion of 
transitioning to a circular economy is gaining traction as 
it allows for better use of the limited available resources 
by encouraging reusing, repairing, remanufacturing and 
recycling existing materials.157 As a result, the European 
industry is in a good position to build on this challenge 
and the related possibilities. Many European businesses 
are already leading in developing new business models 
and are adapting their processes, products and services 
accordingly. Moreover, Europe is becoming a hub for 
innovative, digital solutions that accelerate the transition 
to a circular economy.158
Competition over human resources
At the same time, the transition of most advanced 
industrial countries into knowledge-based economies 
has made high-skilled and specialised workers a major 
resource for competitiveness. In knowledge economies, 
the creation of most goods and services requires a 
specialised set of skills over which many firms compete. 
Some industries (e.g. oil and gas, automobile, mining, 
ICT) are also more dependent on the influx of highly 
skilled workers.159 New skills most in demand include 
cloud computing, big data analytics, mobile application 
development, sales leadership, translation, social media 
marketing, business analysis and industrial design. The 
more innovative and well-off companies and regions 
are often more successful in acquiring the talents they 
need, meaning that others lag and do not have equal 
opportunities to succeed. Some commentators even talk 
about a “war for talent”.160
Knowledge-based economies has made 
high-skilled and specialised workers a 
major resource for competitiveness.
Many countries have formulated a range of policies to 
attract the same pool of highly skilled talents.161 Some 
have been more successful than others: over 70% of 
software engineers in Silicon Valley are foreign-born.162 
In addition to economic incentives, highly skilled talents 
also look for other incentives when deciding on where 
to settle: good quality of life, access to higher quality 
research infrastructure, the opportunity to work with 
other talents and academic freedom.163
According to the graduate business school INSEAD’s 
Global Talent Competitive Index, European countries 
and the US remain top countries in attracting talents.164 
However, Asian nations, such as Singapore and Japan, 
also do well. Other countries, such as the United Arab 
Emirates and Qatar, are also high on the top 25 list. 
Overall, the most competitive countries are all defined 
as high-income countries. Some industries could face 
significant talent shortages by 2030, including within the 
ICT and manufacturing sectors, which in turn would also 
affect high-income countries the most.165
European countries and the US remain  
top countries in attracting talents.
According to the OECD, skills shortages are among the 
biggest challenges faced by businesses today, affecting 
management, health care and ICT sectors particularly 
hard.166 Shortages of skilled workers are also increasingly 
playing as a factor that impedes production and growth.167 
In Europe, some even talk about a “skills-shortage 
crisis”,168 with increasing skills mismatch between under- 
and overqualified workers. Across the EU, professions that 
do not meet current demand include ICT professionals; 
medical doctors; science, technology, engineering and 
mathematics (STEM) professionals; nurses; midwives; 
and teachers.169 The European ICT sector is expected 
to have 756,000 unfilled jobs by 2020, and already 40% 
of ICT companies report difficulties in finding skilled 
workers in Europe.170
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Chapter 2: Towards a European response
1.   THE EU’S INDUSTRIAL POLICY
The need for a European industrial policy has long been 
debated. While ‘industrial’ policies were somewhat out 
of fashion for much of the 1970s to 90s, they regained 
importance among policy policymakers in the early 
2000s, with renewed political concerns surrounding 
deindustrialisation and the migration of manufacturing 
jobs to third countries.171
The need for a European industrial policy 
has long been debated.
Between 1970 and 1990, policymakers preferred 
notions of competitiveness, innovation and enterprise 
policy, focusing on stimulating the competitiveness 
of businesses more generally and steering away 
from direct state intervention in the economy. In the 
European Commission, the name and responsibilities 
of the departments in question have somewhat 
changed over the years. In 2000, the Directorate-
General (DG) Industry became DG Enterprise, which 
was then expanded in 2005 to DG Enterprise and 
Industry. In 2014, the DG merged with DG Internal 
Market, resulting in the current DG for Internal Market, 
Industry, Entrepreneurship and Small and Medium-
Sized Entreprises (DG GROW).172 This merger reflected a 
recognition that industry and the Single Market are two 
sides of the same coin.
For quite some time, European industrial policy 
was almost summed up by the creation of Airbus, 
the aviation champion set up as a consortium of 
European firms in 1970. Airbus has now become 
an unavoidable point of reference when discussing 
new industrial initiatives launched at the European 
level. Recent examples include an “Airbus for chips” 
in microelectronics,173 an “Airbus of the Seas” for 
shipbuilding,174 an “Airbus of batteries” for electric 
vehicles,175 an “Airbus for artificial intelligence” as 
called for by German Minister of Economic Affairs and 
Energy Peter Altmaier,176 and more recently an “Airbus 
of trains” with the (blocked) merger of Siemens and 
Alstom.177 However, as some of these examples show, 
attempts to copy past successes do not always work. The 
Commission has therefore focused on creating firstly the 
necessary framework conditions for industry to flourish. 
Early Commission initiatives 
The Maastricht Treaty was the first to reference 
industrial competitiveness, stating that the “Union and 
the Member States shall ensure that the conditions 
necessary for the competitiveness of the Union’s 
industry exist.”178 Following the entry into force of 
the Treaty, a new sense of activism could be discerned 
from the formulation of the Commission’s notes and 
communications on industry and its competitiveness.179 
EU member states – especially larger ones – also called 
on the Commission to be more active. In 2003, the 
then German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, French 
President Jacques Chirac and British Prime Minister 
Tony Blair called for more targeted policies to address 
deindustrialisation and support manufacturing in 
light of globalisation, as well as avoiding “unnecessary 
burdens on the industry” in a letter addressed to 
Commission President Romano Prodi.180
In the aftermath of the 2008 financial 
crisis, industrial policy was again viewed  
as an important tool to stimulate jobs  
and growth.
In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, industrial 
policy was again viewed as an important tool to stimulate 
jobs and growth.181 In 2010, the Commission published 
the Communication “An Integrated Industrial Policy 
for the Globalisation Era Putting Competitiveness 
and Sustainability at Centre Stage”, highlighting the 
central role manufacturing could play in creating jobs 
and growth and addressing challenges such as climate 
change and an ageing population.182 It was followed 
by the 2012 Communication “A Stronger European 
Industry for Growth and Economic Recovery”, with the 
Commission emphasising investment and innovation 
needs in six areas: advanced manufacturing, key enabling 
technologies (KETs), bio-based products, sustainable 
industrial policy, clean vehicles and smart grids.183 It also 
stated that it would aim to reverse deindustrialisation 
and raise manufacturing’s contribution to Europe’s GDP 
to 20% by 2020. Finally, in yet another Communication 
in 2014, “For a European Industrial Renaissance”, the 
Commission recalled its earlier positions and called on 
member states to mainstream industrial competitiveness 
in all relevant policies.184
Under the Juncker Commission
The Juncker Commission defined “a deeper and fairer 
internal market with a strengthened industrial base” 
as one of its priorities for the 2014-2019 cycle.185 In 
practice, this has meant focusing on the regulation 
of the digital single market (DSM), updating Single 
Market rules and working towards a ‘capital markets 
union’.186 In September 2017, the Commission unveiled 
the Communication “A renewed EU industrial policy 
strategy”, which recalled the importance of bringing 
“industry’s weight in the EU GDP back to 20% by 2020”187 
and listed current and new initiatives under related policy 
areas such as the circular economy, Single Market and 
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skills agenda. Mostly seen as a stocktaking exercise, the 
Communication was criticised for not having included 
new strategic objectives, clear goals and indicators.188
The current fresh momentum and calls for 
a strong EU approach to industry should 
lead to something new. 
A more concrete exercise has been the Digitising 
European Industry initiative under the Digital Single 
Market strategy, which followed the example of various 
national ‘industry 4.0’ initiatives to invest and support 
the deployment of technologies for industry, small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and public 
authorities.189 However, initiatives and investments 
deployed would still have to be significantly increased 
to be comparable to strategies developed by competitors 
such as the US and China. 
Arguably, as it stands today, the EU industry strategy 
does not adequately respond to the challenges currently 
faced by industry.190 The EU’s aim to mainstream 
industrial competitiveness across policy areas can be 
an excellent added-value if implemented efficiently, 
but more could be done. This would require the support 
also especially from member states. Although the 
Commission has been criticised for this lack of ambition, 
it is important to keep in mind the limits to the EU’s 
competence in crucial policy areas, not to mention 
disagreements between member states about what 
an EU industrial strategy should include. The current 
fresh momentum and calls for a strong EU approach to 
industry should lead to something new. 
New momentum 
Until now, EU industrial actions have been moderate in 
scale and have generally focused on framework conditions 
through related policies, such as the Single Market, 
research and innovation. Even if these remain crucial, the 
current context calls for a new, more comprehensive and 
strategic approach, targeting the challenges faced by EU 
industry. EU leaders now seem to be increasingly aware 
of this. At the European Council of March 2019, they 
called on the Commission to present, a “long-term vision 
for the EU’s industrial future, with concrete measures 
to implement it” by the end of 2019.191 In June 2019, the 
Council mentioned “designing an industrial policy fit for 
the future” in the latest EU strategic agenda.192 As such, 
European industry is set to become one of the first tasks 
to be dealt with by the incoming Commission and its 
President Ursula von der Leyen. 
The recognition of the need for EU action has also been 
gaining momentum in member states. While most have 
drafted their own national industrial strategies, they 
have also come to realise that most of the challenges 
industry faces are global in nature and are best tackled 
at the EU level, especially given EU competences on 
trade, competition and the Single Market. Over the years, 
the ministerial conferences Friends of Industry – an 
informal meeting of EU ministers in charge of economy 
and industrial policy – have repeatedly called for the 
bolstering of EU industry and for the Commission to 
become more involved in formulating a common EU 
approach.193 Most recently in December 2018, for their 
sixth meeting, ministers defined their first objective: to 
“[o]btain that the new European Commission, as soon as 
it is in place, propose an ambitious and comprehensive 
industrial strategy based on priority objectives to be 
reached by 2030 as a part of EU long-term strategy.”194 
Note the similar wording to the March 2019 Council 
conclusions, but with more direct references to an 
“ambitious” and “comprehensive” strategy, with “priority 
objectives” for 2030.
But what kind of policy?
Several countries have presented their own views 
for EU action. Germany’s industrial strategy for 2030 
includes suggestions on how to reform EU competition 
rules to better allow for European champions to ‘take 
on’ competition from China and the US. It was quickly 
followed by a “Franco-German Manifesto” on European 
industry in February 2019, which, beyond reviewing EU 
competition rules, also focused on technology funding, AI 
and trade policy.195 The timing (purposefully) coincided 
with the Commission’s decision on the Siemens-Alstom 
merger, an initiative heavily supported by the French and 
German governments, with both insisting that ‘European 
champions’ are needed to be able to fend off competition 
from China. When the Commission, through the voice 
of its Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager, 
decided to block the merger, French Economy Minister 
Bruno Le Maire was quick to declare it a “political 
mistake” which “will serve China’s economic and 
industrial interests”. Meanwhile, his German counterpart 
Altmaier stressed that the decision “demonstrates the 
urgent need for a European Industrial Strategy” and the 
need for “strong European champions”.196
The well-functioning and the ‘completion’ 
of the Single Market are the keys to 
industrial competitiveness.
In July 2019, Poland joined Germany and France in 
reiterating the call “to modernise European competition 
policy” in a common statement.197 Despite using much 
of the same language on the need to update merger 
and state aid rules and take better account of state 
interventions from third countries, it did not refer to 
a possible “right of appeal of the Council which could 
ultimately override Commission decisions”198 – a 
politically sensitive and much-debated suggestion in  
the Franco-German manifesto. 
These initiatives have sparked lively debate on what a 
new EU industrial policy should include.199 Some have 
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feared that an EU industrial policy would only benefit 
so-called ‘champions’ – multinational firms already 
boosting a strong global presence, and predominantly 
from the larger member states, such as France and 
Germany. In response to the Franco-German approach, 
other member states have underlined the need for a 
competitive ecosystem to emerge through the Single 
Market and argued against relaxing EU competition 
rules, highlighting that an EU industrial policy should 
benefit all member states. These views have been 
repeated by Commissioner Vestager, who presented her 
own vision at the EU Industry Days and the EPC, arguing 
for a strategy for “all of Europe” and noting that it “can 
work hand in hand with competition policy”.200
Member states, such as the Benelux, Nordic and Baltic 
countries, often emphasise that the well-functioning 
and the ‘completion’ of the Single Market are the keys 
to industrial competitiveness. This was made clear 
in the letter signed by 17 member states and sent to 
the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, 
in preparation for the March 2019 European Council 
meeting.201 The letter highlighted the role the Single 
Market should play for industrial policy, in enabling 
digital industries to succeed and in developing the 
Single Market for services for industry value chains. The 
letter also referred to an “offensive industrial policy 
to innovate and remain globally competitive in key 
technologies and strategic value chains”.202 Recently, the 
government of the Netherlands referred to a “modern EU 
industrial policy focusing on research and innovation” 
in its position paper on strengthening European 
competitiveness.203 The Finnish government also stated 
that it would “promote an active industrial policy for the 
EU” in its EU Presidency Programme.204
Calls from the industry and unions
Beyond national governments, European firms and trade 
associations and unions have also expressed the need 
for a strong EU industrial policy. Calls from the industry 
have come from across sectors and member states. 
Industry4Europe, a coalition of 147 industry associations, 
has campaigned for an ambitious industrial policy at the 
EU level.205 The European Chemical Industry Council 
(Cefic) has underlined the urgency for a long-term EU 
industry strategy in its manifesto for a competitive 
Europe.206 Similar calls have been expressed by Orgalim, 
which represents technology industries in Europe, in their 
long-term political agenda “2030: An industry vision 
for a renewed Europe”;207 by the European Federation 
of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA) 
in their 2019 manifesto;208 and BusinessEurope, the 
Confederation of European Business.209 IndustriALL, a 
global trade union representing over 50 million workers, 
has presented its own action plan for the future of 
European industry, with a focus on sustainable growth, 
and empowering and training the workforce.210 Similar 
positions have been expressed by the European Trade 
Union Confederation.211
In other words, currents call for a new, modern and 
offensive EU industrial policy can be heard across the 
board. Almost all EU member states and stakeholders 
agree that there is a need for a gear change in the EU’s 
approach, from passive to active. Disagreements persist 
on what this new policy should include and which 
existent policies it should be based around. Chapters 
3 and 4 will provide answers to these questions. The 
subsequent part looks into the EU’s strengths and 
weaknesses in formulating an EU Action Plan for 
Industry. A few core policy areas have been selected: 
innovation, the Single Market, digital and climate policy, 
and circular economy. 
2.   EUROPE’S STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
A. Single market, competition and trade212
Strengths 
The EU’s Single Market remains the greatest added 
value for European industries: it guarantees the free 
movement of goods, services, people and capital by 
removing internal borders and regulatory obstacles to 
trade within the EU. It allows European industries to 
access a consumer market of 500 million, attract intra-EU 
investments, sell abroad and scale up. It also enables their 
integration into European value chains, often decisive 
before scaling up and integrating GVCs. The economic 
benefits of the Single Market amount to 8.5% of the 
EU’s GDP213 and 56 million European jobs depend on the 
trade within it.214 The EU market is therefore unique: 
it represents the largest single market and the most 
integrated transnational market worldwide.215
The EU’s Single Market remains  
the greatest added value for  
European industries.
Within the Single Market, a well-functioning 
competition policy also represents a strong added value 
for citizens and businesses. It allows companies to do 
business on a level playing field and provides a greater 
variety of products and services. Competition policy 
ensures that anti-competitive risks that might occur 
from mergers, public activities or state aid are avoided. 
The strong role played by the EU in investigating and 
enforcing competition rules remains crucial for the 
well-functioning of the Single Market. Together with 
the Commission, national competition authorities also 
ensure that EU rules are enforced throughout the EU. 
The strong role played by the EU in 
investigating and enforcing competition 
rules remains crucial for the  
well-functioning of the Single Market.
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The Single Market also makes Europe one of the most 
important actors in global trade. It provides Europe with 
significant leverage in international trade negotiations 
and helps to attract foreign investments and raise capital 
within the EU. It has allowed the EU to become and 
remain the main destination of foreign investment in the 
world – specifically €6,295 billion by the end of 2017.216 
The OECD also describes EU regimes as the most open in 
the world in its FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index.217 
In recent years, this leverage has been used to open 
new markets through new FTAs with Mercosur, Japan, 
Singapore, Canada, Vietnam and South Korea. More are 
expected to come to fruition, namely with Australia and 
New Zealand. The EU’s trade policy has allowed Europe 
to become the world’s largest exporter of manufactured 
goods and services, and the largest export market  
for around 80 countries worldwide.218 The EU also  
remains one of the strongest voices championing the 
well-functioning of the multilateral trading system. 
Weaknesses
However, despite its obvious advantages for EU industry, 
the Single Market is also facing numerous challenges. 
EU member states are having a hard time agreeing on 
the Single Market reforms suggested by the European 
Commission. Furthermore, its well-functioning is 
facing difficulties from member states being unable 
or unwilling to implement or apply EU rules correctly. 
In particular, this has been the case within fields such 
as PP and services. With growing concerns around 
protectionism and distorted competition, some member 
states and companies are increasingly willing to protect 
themselves by erecting new barriers to trade – in 
which case national bodies are not always effective in 
enforcing Single Market and competition rules.219
Firstly, despite being the main component of modern 
economies, trade in services remains underdeveloped 
within the EU (services account for 8% of EU GDP, 
compared to 25% for goods).220 The Services in the 
Internal Market Directive, adopted in 2006, is far 
from being fully implemented and enforced across 
the EU. With manufacturing and services increasingly 
intertwined, and the growing need for high-skilled 
workers, a Single Market for services is crucial for EU 
industry. Full implementation of the Services Directive 
could add 2% to EU GDP.221
Secondly, the re-emergence of barriers to trade within 
the Single Market represents a serious challenge for EU 
industry. These barriers may take the form of national or 
regional measures established on the grounds of public 
safety, or environmental or health concerns (including 
technical requirements, requests for additional 
documentation or testing). Even if disproportionate 
and discriminatory, they do not always take place on a 
large enough scale to be picked up by the Commission 
for infringement proceedings. Nevertheless, they can 
represent major hurdles for companies and may, in some 
cases, even dissuade them from entering new markets.222
Thirdly, as often pointed out by industry, member states 
are not equally efficient in enforcing Single Market 
rules.223 The enforcement of EU rules is crucial for the 
overall integration and openness of member states. 
Currently, countries such as Slovakia, Czechia, Hungary 
and Belgium have the highest level of integration and 
openness for trade in goods.224
Some member states and companies are 
increasingly willing to protect themselves 
by erecting new barriers to trade.
Another issue faced by industry within the Single Market 
is what is described as the increased complexity of 
market rules.225 SMEs, in particular, complain about the 
complexity of increasing national technical regulations 
and overlapping EU rules. While larger firms may have 
the workforce to ensure that they comply with these 
rules, it is becoming more difficult for new businesses 
and SMEs to do so.
Finally, the openness of the Single Market allows for 
foreign firms that do not fully respect EU competition 
rules to enter the European market. The reality of global 
competition is that state aid and public subsidies remain 
an important element of many third countries’ industrial 
policies. So far, the EU’s competition and trade policy do 
not allow sufficient flexibility to react to rapid changes 
in global competition. 
B. Innovation policy
Strengths
Europe has solid foundations upon which it can enhance 
its innovation performance. First, the EU has a strong 
talent pool and skilled workforce on which it can build. 
Europe has the highest absolute number of researchers in 
the world (i.e. over 1.7 million, overtaking China’s  
1.5 million and the US’ 1.3 million). One-third of the 
world’s top thousand universities for engineering and 
technology are European, as well as five of the top 
ten computer science universities. The EU research 
community accounts for the largest share of 10% of the 
most cited publications, which in absolute numbers 
equals that of the US. Second, the EU workforce 
is becoming more tech-oriented. The number of 
professional developers in the EU today is greater than 
in the US, and the yearly growth of the tech worker 
population is above 3% in France, Germany and the UK.226
According to the Consumer Technology Association’s 
2019 International Innovation Scorecard, the EU scores 
higher than China and is on a par with the US when 
it comes to broadband, human capital (i.e. educated 
workforce) and drones (i.e. law and regulations on the 
use of drone technologies). There are many EU countries 
– mostly Nordic – that are considered ‘international 
innovation champions’, in terms of broadband, 
human capital and infrastructure. Similarly, many EU 
cities are considered tech hubs, paving the way for 
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entrepreneurial ecosystems at the frontier of computer 
science. This is not only the case of the metropoles like 
Paris, London and Berlin but also of newcomers such as 
Copenhagen, Lisbon and Stockholm. This geographical 
spread can represent an asset as it avoids extreme 
agglomeration and capitalises on network effects and 
cross-border connectivity.227
Overall innovation performance in the  
EU has been improving in recent years  
and, for the first time in 2018, has 
overtaken the US.
The 2018 EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard 
is a survey of the 2,500 companies investing the most 
in R&D worldwide. Of these, 577 or 23% are based in 
the EU.229 A sectoral analysis of these companies shows 
that one-third of them operate in the automotive and 
transport sector, compared to only 8% of US companies 
and 11% of firms in China.230 This suggests that the 
European automotive sector is a highly innovative one, 
and where many companies invest significantly in R&D 
compared to other countries.
Similarly, more than 4% of the EU’s most innovative 
companies operate in the aerospace and defence sector, 
which is a larger share than in the US and China (2.7% 
and 0.5% respectively). The stronger presence of highly 
innovative firms in these two sectors, compared to the 
EU’s global competitors, suggests a global comparative 
advantage. The health industry accounts for 22.4% of 
the EU’s most innovative companies and 26.7% for the 
US.231 This suggests that both countries are significant 
global innovators in the sector, while China lags with 
only 3% of its most innovative companies operating in 
the health industry. 
Overall innovation performance in the EU (as defined by 
the European Innovation Scoreboard 2019)232 has been 
improving in recent years and, for the first time in 2018, 
has overtaken the US. South Korea, Canada, Australia 
and Japan are the only global competitors that recorded 
a better innovation performance than the EU in 2018, 
and more specifically in a variety of indicators, too. 
For example, South Korea scores twice as high as the 
EU when it comes to R&D expenditure in the business 
sector, private cofounding of public R&D expenditure, 
and trademark and design applications. Canada does 
significantly better in terms of tertiary education, 
international publications, trademark applications and 
private cofounding of public R&D expenditure. Australia’s 
international publications, innovation collaboration and 
trademark applications boast better performances. Japan 
scores much higher in R&D expenditure of the business 
sector, patent applications and trademark applications.233 
Since 2011, the EU innovation performance has  
increased by 7.7%, in line with other advanced economies 
(e.g. Japan, Australia), but far less than China and South 
Korea, which both improved by more than 15%.
Finally, EU programmes for research, innovation and 
development (R&D&I) provide large amounts of funding 
to universities, research institutions and companies for 
projects spanning from fundamental research to the 
deployment of innovations. Overall, it has been estimated 
that in the 2014-2020 EU budget, around €150 billion 
were allocated to innovation support. This accounts for 
approximately 14% of the total seven-year budget.234  
The largest and best-known programme for research  
and innovation (R&I) is Horizon 2020, a centrally 
managed programme with a budget of €75 billion 
over seven years. Additionally, the European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF) has a clear objective for R&I 
activities, to which it allocates more than €50 billion. 
Other programmes funding R&D&I include structural 
funds like the European Fund for Strategic Investment 
(EFSI, also known as the ‘Juncker Plan’) and the 
COSME (Competitiveness of Small and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises) programme.235
Weaknesses
Europe’s innovation struggles are explained by two 
factors. First, its investment in R&D&I is lower than 
that of its international competitors. Second, it is 
unable to ensure that research results and early-stage 
innovations are brought to market; that they are not lost 
to the so-called ‘valley of death’ in innovation.236
EU spending on R&D as a percentage of its GDP 
has mostly remained static since 2000. The relative 
European investment in R&D is now lower than the 
Chinese and has always been significantly less than 
other advanced countries, namely the US, Japan and 
South Korea (see Figure 18, page 30).
Europe’s investment in R&D&I is lower 
than that of its international competitors.
The same picture emerges when considering the 
absolute level of R&D investment. Although this has 
been increasing steadily in the EU, the rate of growth is 
slower than the US, and both are overshadowed by the 
exponential increase in Chinese investment. The latter 
increased from virtually zero to the same level as the EU 
($350 billion) in just over a decade. In particular, the EU 
INFOBOX 2. Gaining ground in the app economy228
The European app economy consists of 1.8 million jobs – more 
than the US – and job creation increased by 15% between 2016 
and 2017, showing a rapid transformation of the job market. 
Some EU countries are global leaders: the share of total jobs in 
this economy in Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden is only 
slightly below that of Silicon Valley.
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lags when it comes to R&D investment in ICT and digital 
technologies. Only around 20% of the most innovative 
European companies operate in ICT, compared to 52% of 
US and 49% of Chinese companies238 (see Figure 19).
Nonetheless, spending on R&I does not necessarily 
translate into the commercialisation of new products 
and services or higher productivity. Regardless of the 
vibrant start-up environment, European venture capital 
funding is only around 25% of that of the US and China, 
GLOBAL R&D SPENDING IN PPP: CHINESE INVESTMENT IN INNOVATION 
IS NOW ON PAR WITH THE EU ($BN., 1981-2013)
0 
100 
200 
300 
400 
198
1
198
2
198
3
198
4
198
5
198
6
198
7
198
8
198
9
199
0
199
1
199
2
199
3
199
4
199
5
199
6
199
7
199
8
199
9
20
00 20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09 20
10
20
1220
11
20
13
Source: European Political Strategy Centre (2018c)239
Germany 
South Korea 
France 
UK 
Russia 
India 
EU 
US
Japan
China
GLOBAL GROSS DOMESTIC SPENDING ON R&D:
THE EU INVESTS LESS IN R&D THAN ITS GLOBAL COMPETITORS (GDP%, 2000-2017)
0.5 
1.5
20
00 20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09 20
10 20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
20
17
2.5
4.5
3.5
5.5
Source: Authors, based on Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development237 
China 
EU28 
South Korea
Japan
US
TOTAL ANNUAL VENTURE CAPITAL FUNDING: EUROPEAN VENTURE CAPITAL 
IS A FRACTION OF THE US AND ASIA ($BN., 2012-2017)
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers and CB Insights (2018)240
VC funding in Asia
VC funding in the US 
VC funding in Europe 
5.2
32.6
5.2
7.3
36.1
6.4
21.6
59.4
9.6
42.5
76.8
13.6
32.7
61.4
12.6
70.8
71.9
17.6
 Fig. 19 
 Fig. 18 
 Fig. 20 
31
and its rate of growth has been much slower – although 
it did increase threefold between 2012 and 2017 (see 
Figure 20). 
In particular, the difference in funding availability for 
EU and US companies to gain access to capital in later 
stages is substantial when scaling-up.241 Funding for 
basic, early-stage R&D is fairly available in the EU, often 
coming from public (i.e. EU, national) wallets. However, 
later-stage development is less publicly funded. Thus, 
in the absence of venture capital, a valley of death 
is created. The lack of growth capital in Europe is of 
central importance as it impedes the scale-up of young, 
innovative firms, which are either forced out of business 
or bought by larger companies. 
The lack of growth capital in Europe is of 
central importance as it impedes the  
scale-up of young, innovative firms.
The consequences of these weaknesses are apparent 
in innovation outputs. For example, Europe lags 
behind both the US and China in the number of 
patent applications and patents in force.242 Finally, the 
high degree of fragmentation within the EU must be 
noted. Concerning investment in R&I, some European 
countries are world leaders: in 2017, Denmark, Germany, 
Austria and Sweden all invest more than 3% of their 
GDP in R&D. This level is on par with Japan and 
significantly higher than the US. However, the R&D 
investment made in Slovenia and Latvia is below 0.5% 
of their GDP.243 Similarly, the European Innovation 
Scoreboard 2019 shows high diversity among member 
states when it comes to indicators such as employment 
in knowledge-intensive activities, exports of medium- 
and high-tech products and of knowledge-intensive 
services, and sales of new-to-market and new-to-firm 
product innovations.244
Unfortunately, the large number of EU programmes 
targeting R&D&I, mentioned above, does not solve 
this bleak picture. On the one hand, the size of the 
programmes remains relatively small – €150 billion over 
seven years result in just over €20 billion invested per 
year across all 28 member states. On the other, these 
figures are just allocations (i.e. stated intent), while 
evidence of the real impact on innovation results is still 
missing. Additionally, the main EU programme for R&I 
(i.e. Horizon 2020) arguably focuses on universities and 
academic research disproportionally. While EU funds are 
crucial and to be encouraged, the issue of the valley of 
death still looms.
C. Digital agenda
Strengths 
The Single Market is the basis for developing, investing 
and deploying digital technologies throughout Europe. 
The EU has aimed to create a DSM in Europe; and as 
such focus has been put on stimulating a European data 
economy, fostering cybersecurity and maximising the 
potential of online platforms.245 The Commission has 
put forward a wide range of initiatives and progress 
has been seen in recent years (e.g. removing roaming 
charges and unjustified geo-blocking, modernising rules 
for e-commerce, digital contracts, online purchases).
Another focus has been to boost the free flows of  
non-personal and public sector data, and agreeing on 
common data protection rules through the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR). These initiatives can be 
crucial in boosting data mobility in Europe, a prerequisite 
for the development of industrial technologies such 
as AI, IoT and robotics. The GDPR has been a flagship 
initiative of the Juncker Commission and is described 
by some commentators as setting “a New Digital World 
Order”, defining a new global standard for data sharing.246 
If the GDPR evolves into an international standard, it 
can represent an important added-value for EU industry. 
There are, however, certain challenges associated with the 
GDPR, too, which are covered in the next section. 
Furthermore, the EU is among the most developed 
regions in the world when it comes to digitalisation and 
digital skills. The International Digital Economy and 
Society Index (I-DESI) – which looks at digital skills, 
internet usage, integration of technology and digital 
public services – places several EU member states 
among the top ten performers worldwide. These include 
Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands and Denmark.247 While 
there are significant gaps between the top and bottom 
four most digitised EU countries, all EU members have 
progressed overall since 2013. 
The digial single market is far  
from complete.
According to the I-DESI, the EU on average performs 
relatively well in deploying broadband infrastructure248 
and in digital skills249 compared with the rest of the 
world – especially within knowledge-intensive industries 
(see Figure 21, page 32). EU businesses also perform 
relatively well in integrating digital technologies. The 
World Economic Forum’s (WEF) Global Competitiveness 
Report places 13 EU countries among the top thirty in 
ICT adoption, with most EU countries performing better 
than the US and China.250
Weaknesses
Nevertheless, the EU also faces significant challenges 
in digitalisation. For one, the DSM is far from 
complete. Many of the DSM rules adopted still require 
transposition or implementation at the national 
level. Also, many of these rules do not go far enough 
in dismantling regulatory barriers across Europe. 
Unfortunately, some of the new rules (e.g. GDPR) have 
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been a source of additional administrative burdens for 
businesses, hitting SMEs and start-ups particularly 
hard. If the EU struggles to enforce GDPR and impose 
it as a global standard, it could become a significant 
disadvantage for European firms trying to compete 
against foreign firms that do not face the same 
restrictions. If not enforced properly GDPR will also  
fail to deliver real harmonisation. 
The digital performance in the EU varies 
greatly among its member states.
Moreover, the digital performance in the EU varies 
greatly among its member states. In Hungary, Greece, 
Italy, Latvia, Romania and Bulgaria, more than 50% 
of enterprises have very low digital intensity,252 while 
in Finland and Denmark it is under 20%. Similarly, in 
Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia, more than 30% of all 
individuals have no digital skills, while the percentage is 
almost zero in Sweden, Luxembourg and Denmark.253
On a global level, Europe has not been able to claim its 
place within the global platform economy (see Figure 22). 
Indeed, the EU global market share of online platforms 
is almost non-existent (i.e. 3% in 2018) with the US 
dominating the market – although it is losing shares to 
China. EU companies also remain underrepresented in 
ICT GVCs, with the production of major technologies 
increasingly being based outside of Europe. The EU  
has a strong trade deficit towards China when it comes  
to high-tech imports, especially electronics 
communication and computer office machines. 
In addition to being dependent on critical technologies, 
Europe’s digital infrastructure will have to be 
significantly upgraded if the EU is to become a leader 
in emerging technologies. Technology such as 5G is 
crucial to the development of AI, IoT and advanced 
manufacturing. However, Chinese companies such as 
Huawei appear to be in a strong position to emerge as 
technological frontrunners in 5G. According to patent 
analytics firm IPlytics, companies from China have filed 
around 34% of ‘standard essential patents’255 (i.e. “those 
that any company will have to use when implementing 
the standardized 5G technology”),256 compared to 25% 
for firms from South Korea, and 14% for both the US and 
Finland.257 The remaining top ten countries are Sweden 
with 8%; Japan with 5%; and Taiwan, Canada, the UK 
and Italy with less than 1% each. In terms of companies, 
China’s Huawei leads with 15%, followed by Finland’s 
Nokia with 14% and South Korea’s Samsung and LG with 
13% and 12% respectively. Given the current debate 
around the strategic importance of new technologies, it 
is also worth noting that EU member states struggle to 
adopt a common position on Huawei’s 5G. The Chinese 
company has been effectively banned from 5G networks 
in the US, Australia, New Zealand and Japan, with 
concerns regarding Huawei’s proximity to the Chinese 
government and the possibility that its equipment could 
be used to spy on other governments and companies. 
The EU is lagging in investing and 
developing the technologies of the future, 
such as AI, IoT and robotics.
The EU is also lagging in investing and developing 
the technologies of the future, such as AI, IoT and 
robotics. Instead, both the US and China are emerging 
as strong frontrunners in the digital race. A WIPO report 
analysing AI-related patent applications and scientific 
publications concludes that “China and the U.S. are 
now leading research in the field of AI in applied as 
well as more fundamental research”.258 Of the 100 most 
promising AI-related start-ups in 2019 identified by CB 
Insights, 77 are based in the US.259 China, the UK and 
Israel come second with six start-ups each. Meanwhile, 
Germany and Sweden only have one each. CB Insights’ 
top hundred list includes 11 AI ‘unicorn’ start-ups (i.e. 
private companies valued at more than $1 billion) with 
China and the US accounting for five each, while the 
remaining firms are based in the UK. 
D. Climate action and circular economy
Strengths
The EU is a global leader in advancing the environmental 
sustainability agenda globally, including climate action. 
It employs regulation, voluntary measures, funding and 
awareness-raising to promote the agenda within its 
border. Globally, in addition to funding, it is using tools 
such as diplomacy and trade to get others on board. The 
Source: Foley            (2018)251
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EU displayed leadership, for example, in the negotiations 
leading to the Paris Agreement in 2015, and it continues 
to engage with global partners on taking the agenda 
forward. Climate mitigation, environmental protection 
and smarter use of resources via the circular economy 
are increasingly important policy priorities for the EU. 
This is also reflected in the focus given to the European 
Green Deal and the sustainability agenda under the 
incoming European Commission. The EU is politically 
and socially well placed to lead in a transition towards a 
more sustainable economy, with competitive sustainable 
industries at its core.
The EU has shown global leadership in reducing GHG 
emissions and decarbonising its economy, and by aiming 
to provide the industry with a stable and predictable 
framework for the low-emission transition. The EU has 
a substantial policy framework for promoting climate 
action and the much-needed energy transition. As a 
contribution to the implementation Paris Agreement, 
the EU has adopted climate targets for 2030. These 
include a 40% reduction in GHG emissions compared to 
the 1990 level, a 32% share of renewable energy sources 
(RES) in the energy mix, and a 32.5% target for energy 
efficiency. The EU’s climate mitigation efforts have been 
supported by the EU Emissions Trading System (EU 
ETS) and funding. For example, the EU is committed to 
spending at least 20% of its current budget on climate 
action. The Commission’s proposal for the EU to become 
climate-neutral by 2050 is already supported by most 
EU member states, which sends another strong sense of 
direction for industry.
The production of RES in the EU is faring well:260 almost 
half of all EU member states have already reached or 
are about to reach the 2020 renewable energy targets. 
These include Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, Italy, Hungary, Lithuania, Romania 
and Sweden.261 Between 2005 and 2017, the share of 
renewables in the European electricity generation 
doubled from 15% to 31%, with a significant increase in 
wind and solar power.262 As the cost of energy in the EU 
and dependence on external sources are often seen as 
challenges for industry, advancements in cost-efficient, 
domestic renewable energy would contribute to the 
competitiveness of European industry.
Several European industries are already 
global leaders in sustainable solutions.
Significant EU acquis has also been enacted on the wider 
sustainability agenda, covering housing, transport, 
agriculture, chemicals, sustainable consumption (e.g. 
eco-labelled products) and waste management. The 
EU has developed several initiatives under the Circular 
Economy Action Plan.263 European countries, regional 
authorities and businesses are leading in defining 
strategies in favour of a more circular economy,264 and 
the European Commission has been recognised as a 
global leader for said economy by the WEF and Ellen 
MacArthur Foundation.265
The EU has a diverse set of tools to advance 
environmental sustainability at its ready disposal. 
Europe has a strong innovation ecosystem, which is a 
Source: European Political Strategy Centre (2019a)254
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considerable asset for developing and deploying more 
sustainable products and services on the EU and global 
market. The Single Market provides a vast home market 
for scaling up sustainable products and services. EU funds 
are an important source of investment for especially 
climate-related R&I, helping to improve infrastructures 
and contributing to regional development. The EU’s 
trade instruments can also help establish international 
standards for sustainable products. 
It is worth to note that several European industries 
are already global leaders in sustainable solutions. For 
example, European industry is substantially less energy- 
and CO2-intensive than competing ones in China, 
Russia or the US, with the European share of global CO2 
emissions having fallen to 10%.266 European businesses 
are also prominent in using, for example, digitalisation 
to improve the use of resources within the EU.267
Environmental sustainability is often prioritised higher 
on the European business agendas than elsewhere in 
the world. This is guided not only by policies but also 
demands from citizens and consumers, who are showing a 
growing interest in sustainable products and services. EU 
citizens declare a high level of environmental awareness. 
For example, 92% of EU citizens view climate change 
as a serious problem, and a vast majority of 79% agree 
that more public support should be delivered to clean 
energies, to shift away from fossil fuels.268 This broad 
consensus for environmental sustainability provides a 
strong basis for strengthening the needed conditions for 
industry to contribute to this transition further.
Weaknesses
The European industry operates in a global environment 
and competes on a global market. Thus EU’s stringent 
climate targets and environmental regulation compared 
to those of the like of the US, China, India or Russia are 
at times seen as a hindrance to competitiveness, as they 
imply that the industry does not operate on the same 
level playing field. 
Another challenge is the EU’s failure to implement its 
own rules. If businesses within the EU do not play by 
the same rules and there is no adequate punishment 
for failing to follow the EU’s environmental regulation, 
for instance, that means that there is no level playing 
field nor incentive for industries to become more 
sustainable. For example, despite a comprehensive 
regulatory approach on chemicals (especially REACH, 
or the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and 
Restriction of Chemicals), at least one-third of 
chemicals in the EU market do not comply with the 
legal requirements.269 European products can also face 
harsher scrutiny than products that reach the Single 
Market from third countries (e.g. via e-commerce). This 
can be attributed to a lack of market surveillance, for 
example, including proper customs control. This is also 
the case for extended producer responsibility which, 
although primarily envisaged to incentivise producers 
to design more eco-friendly products, it is usually not 
implemented efficiently throughout Europe. 
On the other hand, as EU member states are left with 
considerable room to implement the EU’s environmental 
rules, this sometimes leads to unnecessary market 
distortions and gold-plating, whereby an excess of norms 
or procedures are added when national authorities 
transpose EU directives. Moreover, although climate 
action is a priority for the EU, this has not automatically 
lead to European industry becoming a leader in needed 
solutions. For example, European industry has lost 
ground in developing renewables. Worldwide, the increase 
in renewable energy production is mostly due to a 
booming solar panel industry in China. Although Europe 
took an early lead in the development of solar panels 
and cells with five European firms being among the top 
manufacturers from 2001 to 2004, no European firms 
were present by 2018. Meanwhile, seven of them were 
Chinese.270 The US, India and China are also expected to 
account for two-thirds of global renewables expansion by 
2022. China is also a global market leader in hydropower, 
bioenergy and electric vehicles.271
As EU member states are left with 
considerable room to implement the EU’s 
environmental rules, this sometimes leads 
to unnecessary market distortions and 
gold-plating.
The EU is also facing certain horizontal challenges 
related to the marketisation of new sustainable and 
innovative processes and products. These difficulties 
include the challenge for R&I projects to overcome 
the valley of death in innovation; the persistent 
shortcomings of the Single Market; rising production 
costs related to decarbonisation of industries; and the 
EU’s specific investment profile characterised by slow 
growth, weak demand and declining demographics. 
In the absence of a clear industrial policy that would 
combine the objectives of competitiveness and 
sustainability, corporate boardrooms are often reluctant 
to take investment risks and change practices. When 
new sustainable technological solutions are being 
developed in Europe, they are not always picked up 
because of their higher cost or regulatory barriers. 
The contradictions between the EU policy instruments 
remain a challenge, too. An example is the current EU 
ETS, a pan-European carbon pricing scheme whose 
underperformance – mostly triggered by an abundance 
of free emission allowances that do not react flexibly to 
a declining demand – is portrayed as having contributed 
to a ‘lost decade’ in industrial decarbonisation due to 
insufficient pricing signals.272 Some national schemes 
have even proved more effective than the EU-wide one. 
Another EU policy weakness affecting the prospects 
for deep industrial decarbonisation is related to the 
discrepancy between short-term (i.e. 2020 and 2030)273 
and long-term emission targets (i.e. 2050), with 
the former not being demanding enough to trigger 
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investments consistent with the latter’s ambitions.274 
Arguably, although representing a great added-value, 
the EU’s budget or Multiannual Financial Framework 
(MFF) does not invest in sustainable prosperity and 
competitiveness enough.275
Moreover, the absence of a Single Market for energy, 
renewable electricity, and circular services and products 
hinder the transition to a sustainable economy. The 
EU would need, for example, an electricity market for 
renewables whereby i) installations are placed where 
they are most efficient, ii) electricity flows in a smart 
grid that connects different parts of the EU and allows 
for demand side response and management and iii) 
energy storage is deployed on a large scale. Member 
states still do not recognise the benefits of collaboration 
and often oppose, for example, building interconnectors 
and/or receiving neighbours’ renewable electricity as it 
creates competition on their market. 
Despite the EU’s dependence on raw materials from 
outside its borders and recent efforts to accelerate the 
transition to a circular economy, it also lacks a systematic 
approach to the retention of critical materials in its 
economy. This results in less than optimal material 
recovery from end-of-life products, but sometimes also in 
exports of critical materials to non-EU countries.
Finally, instruments such as taxation, which can provide 
essential support and incentives for businesses and 
consumers to develop and deploy more sustainable 
products and services, are missing from the EU’s toolbox.
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Chapter 3: An Industry Action Plan for the EU
1.   DELIVERABLES OF A EUROPEAN  
INDUSTRY ACTION PLAN
A.   Vision and priorities: Sustainability, 
competitiveness and strategic autonomy
The European Council in March 2019 called on the 
European Commission to present a “long-term vision for 
the EU’s industrial future” by the end of 2019, addressing 
the challenges faced by industry.276 It also underlined that 
this “vision” should include concrete measures, touching 
upon all the relevant policy areas to be implemented. In 
her political guidelines for 2019-2024, President-elect of 
the Commission von der Leyen announced her intention of 
putting forward a “new industrial strategy” for “a future-
ready economy” and in achieving “a just transition”.277
President-elect of the Commission  
von der Leyen announced her intention  
of putting forward a “new industrial 
strategy” for “a future-ready economy”  
and in achieving “a just transition”.
An EU Industry Action Plan, as suggested in this Issue Paper, 
would go a long way to delivering precisely these objectives. 
It would constitute a new strategy for Europe, which includes 
a vision, concrete actions, new policy tools and a governance 
structure to be implemented. A vision for European industry 
for 2030 should be built on three pillars: sustainability, 
competitiveness and greater strategic autonomy.
The EU Industry Action Plan must create the conditions 
for European industry to contribute to improving EU’s 
competitiveness, sustainability and strategic autonomy. 
More specifically, the aim should be to create the 
conditions for European industry to:
q  contribute to high-quality employment and R&D;
q  help to achieve the SDGs, including good health and 
well-being, affordable and clean energy, decent work 
and economic growth, inclusive and sustainable 
industrialisation, and responsible consumption and 
production;
q  support the transition towards climate neutrality by 
2050 and help to deliver on a European Green Deal;
q  become stronger and competitive in value chains 
and key technologies that are strategically crucial 
for achieving the EU’s competitiveness, security and 
sustainability goals (e.g. smart health, industrial AI);
q  become a global leader in developing and deploying 
technology solutions that address today’s greatest 
environmental, societal and security challenges;
q  contribute to achieving greater strategic autonomy 
by better responding to distorted competition, 
leveraging market power and moving towards more 
technological sovereignty.
B. Principles for action
A holistic approach 
Given the unprecedented and multidimensional 
challenges faced by industry, this Paper argues that a 
new, more holistic approach is needed. The member 
states’ call for a “long-term vision for the EU’s industrial 
future” is a welcome starting point, as arguably the 
basis for any action is an agreement on the vision and 
the direction of travel. For too long, the EU has lacked 
an agreement on a vision. 28 member states wishing 
to promote their national industries has not been an 
adequate basis for action. 
The EU Industry Action Plan must 
create the conditions for European 
industry to contribute to improving 
EU’s competitiveness, sustainability and 
strategic autonomy.
Once the vision has been agreed upon, it is possible to 
discuss a strategy – that is, a grand plan to achieve said 
vision with concrete measures to support the strategy. It is 
clear that merely mainstreaming industrial competitiveness 
across policy areas is not a sufficient measure. Greater 
efforts are needed to create conditions for those industries 
to successfully bring sustainable and innovative solutions 
to the market and create the basis for long-term prosperity 
in the future. There is a role for promoting innovation, 
digitalisation, more strategic thinking, and fairer and more 
inclusive approaches. An EU Industry Action Plan should 
build on the initiatives already in place. For example, those 
under the Single Market, trade, energy, climate, research, 
innovation, competition and digital policies. Moreover, 
it should include new and additional initiatives and 
instruments, specifically targeted to tackle some of the most 
pressing issues mentioned in this paper. ‘More of the same’ 
is not an option. A more holistic approach that recognises 
the inherent cross-cutting nature of these challenges and 
develops initiatives to restore industrial competitiveness 
is necessary. Such an approach would also imply that 
industrial policy should enjoy a strong coordinating 
portfolio within the European Commission.
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A role for coordinated EU action
National industry initiatives could potentially 
undermine EU industrial competitiveness in the long 
run if it is not in line with EU policies such as the Single 
Market, competition and trade policy. The EU, therefore, 
has a strong role to play in complementing and 
coordinating various EU member states’ initiatives. An 
Industry Action Plan would foresee a substantial role for 
the Competitiveness Council, especially its High-Level 
Working Group on Competitiveness and Growth and the 
Commission’s DG GROW.
‘More of the same’ is not an option.
Moreover, coordinated EU action would enable member 
states to provide a coherent response to competition 
from third countries, something they are currently 
unable to do effectively at the national level. EU industry 
would thus be able to react to the rise of protectionism 
and adopt distorted trade as part of foreign industrial 
policies. Finally, it would strengthen Europe’s position 
to protect EU interests within a rules-based system and 
champion the necessary reforms to global trade. 
Making it work: A designated governance structure 
For proper enforcement of the Industry Action Plan, a 
designated governance structure should be set up within 
the EU institutions. Given the cross-cutting nature of the 
issues to be addressed, the Industry Action Plan should 
be defined, implemented and monitored from a high 
level within the Commission, with a designated project 
team that includes all relevant Commissioners. 
Within the proposed von der Leyen Commission, two 
central personalities would be Executive Vice President 
Margrethe Vestager, in charge of Europe fit for the 
Digital Age and DG Competition; and the would-be 
Commissioner in charge of DG GROW, DG CONNECT 
and the future DG Defence Industry and Space. Due to 
his or her direct access to the most relevant DGs, the 
future Commissioner in charge of DG GROW should 
provide leadership in developing an Industry Action 
Plan. Overall, close cooperation between Vice President-
designate Vestager and the upcoming Commissioner 
of DG GROW will be paramount: they will both have to 
combat distorted competition as well as make the Single 
Market work through the enforcement of EU rules. The 
Commissioner of DG GROW should also monitor and 
coordinate EU member states’ industrial initiatives. 
The nominated First Executive Vice President Frans 
Timmermans, in charge of the European Green Deal, 
should also be involved in this work. Other relevant 
portfolios would include the Executive Vice President 
for An Economy that Works for People; the High 
Representative as well as Commissioners for Trade, 
Jobs, Innovation and Youth, and Cohesion and Reforms.
Furthermore, an Industry Action Plan should 
create substantial roles for EU member states and 
the European Parliament. The European Council 
could provide conclusions and political support for 
the development of an Action Plan, based on the 
renewed vision to be presented by the Commission 
by the end of 2019. The Council’s Competitiveness 
Council, and especially its High-Level Working Group 
on Competitiveness and Growth, should be closely 
involved and consulted in the formulation of the Action 
Plan. The Competitiveness Council should also meet 
regularly to monitor the implementation of the Action 
Plan. The European Parliament Committee on Industry, 
Research and Energy should provide input to the Action 
Plan. Other relevant committees, such as on Internal 
Market and Consumer Protection, Employment and 
Social Affairs, Budgets, and International Trade should 
also be consulted.
An Industry Action Plan should create 
substantial roles for EU member states and 
the European Parliament.
2.   OBJECTIVES OF A EUROPEAN INDUSTRY 
ACTION PLAN
Leveraging market power more strategically
An Industry Action Plan should take into full account the 
geopolitical realities faced by the EU. Access to critical 
raw materials, foreign takeovers of major European tech 
companies and distorted competition constitute growing 
strategic challenges which threaten Europe’s aim to 
promote peace and protect its citizens and freedoms. 
Combating distorted competition 
In third countries, industrial policies are increasingly 
justified on the grounds of national security: they do 
not hesitate to intervene in their economy by shielding 
companies from international competition, imposing 
tariffs on foreign goods, providing export subsidies for 
their own companies or forcing foreign firms to share its 
technology. Moreover, even if Europe has opened much 
of its market to the rest of the world, European industry 
rarely enjoys equal access to markets in third countries. 
While the EU should continue to champion free and open 
trade, it cannot remain naïve in granting access to foreign 
industry that does not play by the same rules. A priority 
for an Industry Action Plan should be closer coordination 
between EU Trade and Single Market policies to ensure 
better reciprocity in market access and counter distorted 
competition from third countries. Additional tools should 
be defined at the EU level to limit access to parts of the 
Single Market, if and when reciprocity is not respected.
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 Screening foreign investments 
The lack of growth capital in the EU has too often led 
to increased foreign influence and takeovers of major 
European tech firms and start-ups. This may have 
security implications, with key technologies possibly 
moving abroad and complicating the control and 
imposition of cybersecurity standards. The lack of 
investment reciprocity with several third countries also 
implies that foreign investors enjoy far greater access to 
the European market than is true of the reverse. The fact 
that Europe is the top destination in the world for FDIs 
remains important for EU industry to grow and scale up. 
However, Europe must find ways to scrutinise foreign 
investments in major European industries and critical 
technologies more effectively. The new EU rules on FDI 
screenings are a step in the right direction but arguably 
do not go far enough to allow for binding measures in 
cases where FDIs might represent a security threat. 
While the EU should continue to champion 
free and open trade, it cannot remain naïve 
in granting access to foreign industry that 
does not play by the same rules.
Facing digital competition better
The European data industry is already competing 
against foreign (especially Chinese) companies that 
enjoy much wider access to vast amounts of data in their 
home markets – both with and without express consent. 
In China, many of these firms are also state-owned, 
-subsidised and/or benefit from regulatory advantages. 
This often gives foreign firms a significant competitive 
advantage in developing AI, IoT and robotics that are 
fuelled and constantly improved by large datasets. In 
formulating an Industry Action Plan, the EU should be 
aware of the reality the European data industry faces. 
Although the European model should remain based on 
a high level of data protection, safety, transparency and 
liability for individuals and companies, new and improved 
systems should also be put into place in order to make 
foreign companies comply with EU rules when operating 
in the Single Market. Complying with EU rules cannot 
represent a competitive disadvantage for EU companies.  
Allowing for a free flow of data 
A review of current EU legislation will also be necessary 
to boost the development of data-related technologies. 
New EU rules on the free flow of non-personal data and 
the reuse of public sector information provide a great first 
step in unleashing data mobility. The GDPR represents 
one such significant step in harmonising data protection 
rules across member states and arguably makes Europe a 
global rule-maker for digital technologies (provided that 
the rules are effectively enforced by all member states). It 
is, however, important to make sure that administrative 
costs and limitations on the use of data imposed by GDPR 
do not lead to a competitive disadvantage for European 
industry, especially for SMEs and start-ups that do not 
possess the same resources and skills as large (and often 
foreign) digital firms do. While a review of GDPR might 
become necessary, new data legislation should aim to find 
a good balance between the principles of data protection 
and free data flows. The EU should find ways to include 
cross-border data flows in their FTAs and international 
trade agreements negotiated under the WTO more actively. 
Complying with EU rules cannot  
represent a competitive disadvantage  
for EU companies. 
Safeguarding critical raw materials
Europe’s industry has always been dependent on certain 
raw materials to produce a wide range of goods and 
applications. Still, materials like metals and minerals 
(e.g. tungsten, cobalt, antimony, palladium) are 
becoming ever more important for developing digital 
technologies. In the EU, 88% of raw material imports 
are used for electrical and electronic equipment.278 
However, climate change, water scarcity, political 
instability and conflicts have further reduced stocks that 
are already facing depletion. The European Commission 
has therefore created a list of “critical raw materials” 
that are deemed essential to the EU’s economy and 
for which supply chain disruptions persists.279 In order 
to minimise such disruptions, the EU should invest 
in finding alternatives (i.e. redesigning products and 
processes to reduce critical materials consumption and 
make them easier to recover), recovering materials (e.g. 
urban mining, circular processes) as well as continue to 
update its list of critical raw materials. The fact that on 
certain occasions, the EU exports critical materials to be 
processed in non-EU countries is arguably a cause for 
concern and an issue to be addressed in an industrial 
policy aiming for smarter use of resources.
CASE STUDY 4: Urban mining
Urban mining – recovering raw materials from IT and electronic 
waste – has become increasingly common for industry given the 
limited number of raw materials, and that classic mining cannot 
meet the rising demand for electronics. The ProSUM project, 
funded by the EU and Swiss government, has developed the 
Urban Mine Platform, the first European open-access platform 
containing all available data on the composition and waste of 
electrical and electronic equipment, batteries and end-of-life 
vehicles.280 The database aims to improve the traceability of 
products, materials and waste by creating a unified inventory to 
recover and retain the value of secondary raw materials. It is a 
first step towards mapping Europe’s ‘urban mine’, although some 
challenges persist, such as waste and product characterisation; 
the quantification of stocks and flows in the urban mine; and 
the data harmonisation, quality and interoperability of datasets.
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Smarter use of resources within the Single Market
Thinking more strategically should also include a 
smarter use of the resources at our disposal. Better 
product design can ensure greater durability,  
reusability, reparability, recyclability and more.  
So far, energy-related products are the only products 
covered by the EU’s ecodesign requirements. Further 
developments should entail the inclusion of circularity 
aspects into ecodesign requirements and standards,  
and extension of the ecodesign rules to cover  
non-energy-related products. When it comes to  
end-of-life materials, the focus of existing EU policies 
and legislation has mainly been on recycling. This 
approach downplays the opportunities reuse, repair 
and remanufacturing provide for better retention of 
the value of components and materials. Although the 
amended Waste Framework Directive places a greater 
emphasis on reuse and repair practices,281 more can 
be done to incentivise such practices via regulatory 
measures and economic instruments.
Thinking more strategically should also 
include a smarter use of the resources at 
our disposal.
The EU has already set ambitious targets for the 
recycling of municipal and separate waste streams  
(e.g. packaging, electronics, vehicles). Besides exploring 
possibilities to increase current separate collection 
recycling targets (e.g. to retrieve critical materials and 
recover textile and construction materials), additional 
steps are required to increase the uptake of recycled 
contents into new products (e.g. plastics). The EU can  
do much to improve the situation (e.g. by defining 
end-of-waste criteria and specifying quality criteria for 
recycled materials). Member states and subnational 
authorities can further boost the demand for such 
criteria via Green Public Procurement and taxation 
policies within the framework provided by the EU.
The existence of industrial symbiosis since the 1970s 
demonstrates the potential for these types of business 
models to generate value for the industry and retain 
materials and energy within the economy. These 
initiatives have so far mainly been confined to specific 
industrial zones (i.e. limited by geographic constraints 
due to efficiency and convenience of such collaboration). 
The development of innovative technologies, especially 
digitally-enabled solutions, provide an opportunity 
to enhance information sharing (i.e. in terms of 
supply and demand for materials and energy, and the 
conditions for such exchange). The EU should take 
note of such developments and support prospective 
projects on industrial symbiosis that are coupled with 
the deployment of digital tools, to scale up collaboration 
beyond specific industrial zones.
Enabling more innovation
The ability to innovate creates the basis for sustainable 
growth in a mature economy, such as that of the 
EU. To achieve this, an Industry Action Plan must 
present a holistic innovation strategy that addresses 
the shortcomings that currently affect innovation 
performance. The main aspects to be tackled are the 
commercialisation of research outcomes, access to 
capital, risk-taking behaviour, IPRs, the regulatory 
framework and human capital.
The ability to innovate creates the basis for 
sustainable growth in a mature economy.
Improving commercialisation
The thriving, world-class academic research 
environment in the EU struggles to translate its 
outcomes to the market. Research results are lost in 
the valley of death before they are commercialised. An 
industrial strategy should bridge the gap between the 
academic and business world to foster communication 
and partnerships between the two sectors. To create new 
products and processes from academic and lab research, 
innovation policy should assess and break down the 
practical and cultural barriers to such cooperation.
CASE STUDIES 5-6: Industrial symbiosis – A way 
forward for sustainable industries 
Industrial symbiosis282 describes a process whereby instead 
of throwing away or destroying surplus resources, industries 
cooperate to redirect them into other companies’ processes.283  
It can significantly reduce costs and waste and promote  
eco-innovation, with companies (usually) cooperating in 
geographic proximity within an industrial ecosystem.
Äänekoski industrial site 
Metsä Group – a Finnish forestry industry firm – has developed 
an industrial ecosystem at Äänekoski, Finland, where surplus 
materials like bark pulp and sulfuric acid are converted into new 
materials or energy (e.g. biogas, bio-composites, fertilisers) by 
industrial partners in the region. This collaboration allows the 
bio-product mill to become 240% self-sufficient in electricity, 
run without fossil-based energy and create 1,500 new jobs in 
the value chain.284
Kalundborg industrial site 
Another example of industrial symbiosis can be found in 
Kalundborg, Denmark; the first of its kind when established 
in 1972.285 It now comprises of six private and three public 
partners who employ around 5,000 employees in total. Partners 
exchange materials, water, energy (over 25 different resource 
streams) as part of their industrial operations. This collaboration 
developed organically over the past decades and now includes 
a set of shared values and a formal structure (i.e. Kalundborg 
Symbiosis). Before making a decision, companies consider the 
potential impact of their decisions on other partners. Business 
savings are estimated to be €14 million per year; socioeconomic 
savings, €28 million; and emission reductions, 635,000 tonnes 
of CO2 per year.
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Accessing capital
Young innovative companies in the EU face more 
difficulties accessing growth capital than those in the US, 
for example. Banks provide most of the capital available 
to growing firms, including innovative start-ups. These 
institutions, however, require collateral and tend to avoid 
lending to firms deemed too risky. Such practice negatively 
affects innovative start-ups; precisely those companies 
that would need funding the most. The consequence for 
those that cannot access finance is being driven out of 
business or bought up by an established (and often foreign) 
company. There needs to be an alternative source of 
growth capital for innovative companies other than banks. 
The EU’s industrial strategy should facilitate access to 
alternative sources of funding and support the growth of 
EU venture capital and investment funds that are willing  
to take higher risks. Public venture capital cannot  
replicate such an environment but can encourage its 
emergence by leading by example and offering incentives 
to private investors.
Allowing risk-taking 
Innovation and failure go hand in hand, as not all 
innovative ideas or products can expect to be successfully 
adopted or profitable. Risk-taking is thus intrinsic to the 
concept of innovation, implying the persistent possibility 
of failure. This is true for both private investors, which 
leads to the inadequacy of banks, as mentioned in the 
previous point, and for public investment. Funded by 
taxpayers’ money, public investment is usually directed to 
‘safe’ projects that ensure a (monetary or social) return. 
When it comes to innovation, a fully-fledged cultural 
change is needed to accept that not all funded projects 
may be successful. An Industry Action Plan that aims 
to promote innovation with public EU funding amongst 
others must recognise the possibility that parts of that 
investment will be lost. Once this dynamic is admitted, 
special instruments should be used to fund risky projects, 
some of which may become ground-breaking innovations, 
while others may never even leave the testing facility.
When it comes to innovation, a  
fully-fledged cultural change is needed  
to accept that not all funded projects  
may be successful. 
A solid intellectual property framework
The protection of intellectual property (IP) on 
innovations and the resulting monetary returns are 
fundamental reasons why a company should research 
and create new products. In an increasingly fast-paced, 
tech-heavy environment, the rate of obsolescence 
is high. To maintain their market share, firms must 
innovate existing products and create new ones very 
quickly. It is thus crucial that the system protecting IP 
operates promptly to assess and eventually grant IPRs. 
A solid and well-functioning IP framework is becoming 
increasingly important as open access systems gain 
ground. The Industry Action Plan must ensure swift and 
effective IP protection, not only to encourage firms to 
innovate by protecting them from competitors but also 
incentivise them to take part in publicly funded projects 
that require open access to research results. 
Boosting skills
Innovation policy must also promote education and 
training. A skilled workforce is a prerequisite for 
innovation, and the lack thereof is a significant barrier. 
A firm cannot adopt new technologies and innovate 
its processes if its workforce (or the one available in 
the labour market) is not skilled enough to use and 
implement them. Similarly, a high level of skills is 
required for research and disruptive innovation. Thus, an 
Industry Action Plan that seeks to promote innovation 
must prioritise education policy to ensure that new 
additions to the workforce have the adequate skills and 
training. Additionally, it should continue to upgrade 
the skills of the existing workforce to keep up with 
technological change. Although EU competence remains 
limited when it comes to education policy, member states 
should envisage delegating shared competences – those 
important for industrial competitiveness – for certain 
parts of vocational training to the EU.
Member states should envisage delegating 
shared competences – those important for 
industrial competitiveness – for certain 
parts of vocational training to the EU.
Sustainable finance
The ongoing sustainable finance agenda286 aims to align 
the EU’s financial sector with the sustainability agenda 
(i.e. environmental protection and climate mitigation) 
by defining which activities are sustainable and setting 
the rules for the disclosure of information, for example. 
This is an opportunity for the EU’s financial sector and 
consequently the industry to lead the way in ‘greening’ 
its operations. Conversely, avoidance of excessive 
regulatory detriments must be taken into account 
(especially for start-ups and SMEs) as well as ensuring 
that the EU financial and industrial sectors can retain 
their global competitiveness.
Innovating towards net-zero emissions
Technological upgrade has optimised industrial 
processes for decades, providing significant 
achievements in terms of energy efficiency and 
overall emission reduction. However, further emission 
abatement potential with the best available technologies 
(BAT)287 is limited. BAT could reduce the iron and steel 
industry’s carbon footprint by 7.5% using an electric 
arc furnace, or just 2% with a blast furnace. In the 
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petrochemical sector, emission reduction under BAT is 
expected to be between 2% and 10%, while in cement it 
is between 6% and 8%.288 These limited gains risk being 
overcompensated by the expected growth in production. 
Efficiency and a switch to less carbon-intensive fuels 
(i.e. from coal to natural gas) can only serve short-term 
mitigation ambitions. In supporting the 2050 climate-
neutral goal, an Action Plan should identify all the 
possible pathways for the decarbonisation of industry 
and mobilise different EU policies in achieving net-
zero emissions. Particular attention will have to be 
placed on infrastructure build-out and heavy industries 
such as cement, steel and chemicals, which are heavy 
users of fossil fuels and account for 14% of Europe’s 
GHG emissions.289 The most significant technological 
pathways include electrification and fuel switching in 
fossil fuel-based processes, low carbon processes based 
on material substitution, carbon capture and storage,290 
and enhanced circularity. The role of an Industry Action 
Plan in triggering different pathways will, therefore, 
need to be comprehensive and include a mix of 
regulatory and financial support, protection, and policy 
coordination and coherence.
Technological sovereignty and digitising industry 
New digital technologies represent an opportunity 
to reinvent industrial production and promote more 
competitive and sustainable business models. An 
Industry Action Plan should embrace digitisation 
and the rise of new technologies such as AI, IoT and 
industrial robotics. A comprehensive regulatory and 
financial boost to digital technologies is an absolute 
prerequisite for Europe; retaining the status quo 
would only imply a significant loss in competitiveness 
and strategic autonomy. Ensuring that the basic 
infrastructure is deployed (e.g. broadband, 5G, fibre) 
is a necessary prerequisite to achieving the transition 
to a more competitive and sustainable industry. The 
EU should also ensure that data and digitally-enabled 
solutions are developed and deployed to make the 
economy and industry more sustainable. It is worth 
keeping in mind that digitalisation alone will not 
bring greater sustainability, but can lead to the higher 
consumption of precious (i.e. critical) materials and 
energy for electrical and electronic equipment, if not 
steered and governed well.
An Industry Action Plan should embrace 
digitisation and the rise of new technologies 
such as AI, IoT and industrial robotics.
Achieving technological sovereignty 
In recent years, digital technologies have become 
strategic tools with the potential to heavily influence 
society, economy and political processes. They 
increasingly define the ability of international actors 
to project soft and hard power. In such a context, the 
EU will fail to advance towards strategic autonomy if it 
is not at the forefront of technological innovation and 
efforts to regulate emerging technologies.294 Firstly, 
vulnerabilities in cellular networks and digital and 
critical infrastructure can be targets of cyberattacks, 
industrial espionage and disinformation campaigns.295 
The EU and its member states should, therefore, make 
sure that they develop the necessary cybersecurity tools 
to address these challenges. Secondly, Europe’s inability 
to be at the forefront of technological leadership 
suggests that it will become ever more dependent on 
foreign components and digital solutions developed in 
countries – even authoritarian – that do not necessarily 
uphold the same cybersecurity standards. Innovation in 
digital technologies is therefore imperative for Europe, 
while strict standards and a common EU precautionary 
stance should be applied to critical digital infrastructure.
The EU will fail to advance towards 
strategic autonomy if it is not at  
the forefront of technological  
innovation and efforts to regulate 
emerging technologies.
Enabling a European industry 4.0
Industry in Europe is already innovating and investing 
in new digital technologies, thus allowing for the 
emergence of new products (e.g. 3D printing, new 
materials), better planning and testing (e.g. digital twin, 
AI) and in improving processes (via e.g. robotics, IoT, 
smart communication systems). These developments 
must be supported and diffused throughout the EU. 
Europe’s reindustrialisation will only come about if 
industry 4.0 and the development of more competitive, 
innovative and sustainable industries are fully 
embraced. Important work has already commenced 
at the EU level via a network of digital innovation 
CASE STUDY 7: The pharmaceutical industry  
and innovation
The EU remains the world’s leading exporter of pharmaceutical 
products, with a record trade surplus of €91 billion in 2018.291 
Pharmaceuticals account for almost 11% of EU exports, after 
‘machinery and vehicles’ (50%) and ‘non-electrical goods’ 
(27%).292 The pharmaceutical industry is a sector where Europe 
has a significant competitive advantage. However, in order to 
remain competitive, the pharmaceutical and biotech industry  
is dependent on R&D&I more than any other industry. On 
average, a new medicine takes 12 to 13 years and costs  
€2.33 billion to develop, representing a significant investment 
for a company. In the EU, 28% of new medicines originate from 
large pharmaceuticals companies, compared to 48% from SMEs 
and intermediate-size companies, 17% from academic or public 
bodies, and 7% from public-private partnerships.293 A sound 
regulatory ecosystem, solid IP framework and access to capital 
are therefore all crucial for Europe to retain its competitive 
advantage. The future competitiveness of the pharmaceutical 
industry will be tied to its ability to access health data and 
develop data-related products and services. 
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hubs (DIHs): ICT for manufacturing SMEs, data pitch 
innovation programmes, open robotics and technology 
transfer, photonics innovation, supercomputing, and 
DIHs supported by the European Institute of Innovation 
and Technology.296 Still, not all of the regions of the EU 
are adequately covered by DIHs – especially the newer 
EU13 member states – and consequently are not in a 
position to benefit from digitisation equally.
Europe’s reindustrialisation will only come 
about if industry 4.0 and the development 
of more competitive, innovative and 
sustainable industries are fully embraced. 
Moreover, the transition towards a circular economy 
could be enabled through the development of industry 
4.0. Digital technologies would help to improve 
connectivity and information sharing; make products, 
processes and services more circular; and influence 
and empower consumers.297 For example, service-based 
business models, often enabled by digitalisation, can 
result in reduced material consumption and emissions 
and better end-of-life treatment. Servitisation should 
merit closer attention from the EU and its member 
states. Different sets of regulatory and financial tools 
(i.e. standards, tax incentives) should create favourable 
conditions for service-based business models. 
 
Creating new jobs within manufacturing 
While in recent decades Europe has had to contend 
with deindustrialisation and the massive offshoring 
of manufacturing jobs, new digital technologies offer 
the opportunity to bring jobs and growth ‘back home’. 
Automation means that labour costs are less relevant 
when deciding where to locate production, and the 
development of knowledge-intensive value chains 
tend to favour a high-skilled workforce. Digitisation 
is already creating new types of jobs that did not exist 
until a few years ago. An Industry Action Plan should 
aim to support smart manufacturing throughout Europe 
by enabling the creation of new jobs for the future. The 
focus should be placed on technologies that can provide 
positive spillovers in creating jobs.  
Investing in digital skills
Beyond the creation of new jobs, automation will also 
bring about significant transformations to current 
jobs and working conditions while some jobs will 
undoubtedly disappear. As acknowledged by the 
Commission, digitisation is already “replacing low-
skill routine tasks and raising the skill threshold of 
employability”.301 Some speak of ‘dark factories’, where 
no light is needed since all production processes are 
fully automated around the clock.302 However, while 
only a few jobs can be fully automated in the short 
and medium term, most jobs could be automated by 
up to 40% to 50% today. In other words, rather than 
immediate substitution, digitisation is more likely to 
lead to a high level of interaction between workers and 
technology. Therefore, the importance of digital skills 
cannot be overstated. An Industry Action Plan should 
support a wide range of initiatives aiming to re- and 
upskill workers in all sectors of industry. Education and 
vocational training programmes must also be reviewed 
and adapted to anticipate and prepare for the changing 
nature of work. Failure to do so will only lead to greater 
polarisation and exclusion on the labour market and 
between EU regions. 
New digital technologies offer the opportunity 
to bring jobs and growth ‘back home’.
CASE STUDY 8: Blockchain and the circular economy 
The Dutch company Circularise uses blockchain to improve 
transparency and communication across the circular value 
chains for industry. Its Smart Questioning technology enables 
companies and stakeholders to gain information about the 
content of a product via a securised Q&A system. It allows for 
more efficient data sharing while also addressing the industry’s 
need for data protection. Improving information-sharing across 
the value chain is considered one of the major challenges in 
achieving a circular economy.298
CASE STUDY 9: Digital manufacturing
Digital technologies are increasingly being deployed on the 
factory floor. The Amberg factory in Bavarian Germany is a 
digitised electronic equipment factory developed by Siemens, 
paving the way for industry 4.0.299 There, technologies such as 
IoT, AI, edge computing and sensors allow for the identification 
of all objects (i.e. components, products, production steps), the 
recording of all process parameters, real-time data analysis 
and automated predictive maintenance. Some 75% of the 
value chain is automated.300 With an open cloud system, the 
algorithms used are continuously trained with data from all over 
the world. Digital factories can reduce energy consumption and 
waste during production, as well as improve productivity and 
cut costs.
CASE STUDY 10: Increased interaction between 
workers and technology
Airbus is cooperating with Bosch to develop smart and 
connected handheld tools (e.g. drill, saw, power tool).303 
Employees can be redirected to the appropriate tool for certain 
tasks, with smart tools guiding them to the next step and 
automatically calculating the correct calibration.304 Smart tools 
can also record the operation and ensure better quality control 
and significantly improve the safety and efficiency of workers. 
It also allows for improved optimisation of tools and machines, 
reducing the need for replacement and avoiding unnecessary 
waste. However, in such a setting, digital skills and retraining 
workers becomes essential.
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Becoming a leader in developing trustworthy and sustainable 
artificial intelligence
The EU aims to place trustworthy and ethical AI at the 
heart of AI development in Europe.305 This constitutes 
a good basis for defining a genuine European strategy 
on AI, machine learning and big data. Europe should 
not try desperately to catch up with the US and China, 
for instance, in terms of the amount of AI patents or 
industrial robots being developed). Rather, Europe 
should adopt its own goals-based strategy, focusing on 
notions of ‘AI for humanity’ and ‘AI for good’ to help 
solve some of the major challenges it faces. It should 
support the development of digital technologies in areas 
such as health, circular economy and sustainability. The 
EU should set itself the goal of becoming a global leader 
in using data and AI solutions to achieve a sustainable, 
circular economy.306
An Industry Action Plan should support a 
wide range of initiatives aiming to re- and 
upskill workers in all sectors of industry.
Beyond guidelines, it is important that the EU’s 
approach to ethical AI is now translated into concrete 
actions and projects. It is essential to clarify in 
regulatory terms what ethical AI implies for the 
development of industrial AI. An Industry Action Plan 
should not overregulate emerging digital technologies 
or unnecessarily limit the free flow of data that is crucial 
to the development of AI-related technologies. Better 
liability frameworks might still be necessary to ensure 
transparent and fair AI systems and algorithms for both 
consumers and businesses. 
Investing in key enabling technologies
An Industry Action Plan should mobilise financial and 
regulatory support to boost the further development of 
KETs in Europe. KETs are critical knowledge-intensive 
technologies for EU industry, associated with “high 
R&D intensity, rapid innovation cycles, high capital 
expenditure and highly-skilled employment.”307 KETs 
have been designated as a priority for EU industrial 
policy and were defined in 2009 to include advanced 
manufacturing technologies, advanced materials, 
nanotechnology, micro-/nanoelectronics, industrial 
biotechnology and photonics.308 Given the speed at 
which new technologies are being developed, the EU 
should continuously monitor and update its list of KETs. 
In its latest report, the High-level Strategy Group on 
Industrial Technologies has suggested updating KETs 
to include AI, digital security and connectivity; as well 
as broadening the scope to categories like ‘life sciences 
technologies’, ‘materials and nanotechnology’ and 
‘photonics, micro- and nano-technologies’.309 The work 
of experts groups – such as the Industry 2030 High-Level 
Industrial Roundtable, the High-level Strategy Group 
on Industrial Technologies and the Strategic Forum 
for Important Projects of Common European Interest 
(IPCEI) – should be continued and made permanent, 
focusing on what investments and regulatory measures 
are needed for the effective deployment of key 
technologies for EU industry.
The Important Projects of Common 
European Interest has been completely 
underutilised over the years.
INFOBOX 3: The Important Projects of Common European Interest (IPCEI) tool
Recently, the IPCEI tool has gained much attention within the 
debate on EU industry. Enshrined in Article 107 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the EU, the tool allows member states to 
support and provide public funding for highly innovative projects 
of common European interest, in compliance with EU rules  
(i.e. internal market, competition, state aid rules). In order to be 
recognised as an IPCEI, a project should help overcome market 
failure or funding gaps, involve several member states  
and generate positive spillovers into the internal market.310  
IPCEI provides a concrete response to the calls from some EU 
leaders for more flexibility in supporting and creating new 
industrial champions: public endeavours are welcome as  
long as they benefit Europe in promoting new innovative and 
sustainable industries.311
However, although an excellent tool, IPCEI has been completely 
underutilised over the years. The first project on microelectronics 
was launched only last year, four years after it was initially set 
up. It is essential to make sure that the proposals currently being 
developed, on batteries and high-performance computing, can be 
executed rapidly, and that additional initiatives can be launched, 
covering for all the key value chains identified by the Strategic 
Forum on IPCEI:
q  clean, connected and automomous vehicles;
q  ‘Smart Health’ (medical devices, personalised medicine  
and analytics);
q  low CO2 Emissions Industry;
q  hydrogen technologies and systems;
q  industrial IoT;
q  cybersecurity;
q  batteries;
q  microelectronics;
q  high-performance computing.
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Increasing EU funding
There is, in other words, no shortage of initiatives to be 
funded by the EU and its member states. Significantly, 
more funding should be provided through the EU’s 
budget for the development and diffusion of KETs, DIHs, 
AI, cybersecurity, digital skills, quantum and super-
computing. The EU budget should also support the 
launch of a series of technological moonshot projects 
where EU industry is already strong, such as circular 
economy, low-carbon technologies, quantum, advanced 
manufacturing robotics and advanced biomaterials. The 
IPCEI framework should be reviewed and used much 
more actively to support such initiatives. Through the 
Digital Europe programme (DEP), Horizon Europe, the 
InvestEU fund and the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), 
the 2021-27 MFF should provide earmarked and targeted 
funding for such initiatives. If EU member states are 
serious about achieving technological autonomy and 
leadership, these MFF programmes should be greatly 
increased, as called for by the European Parliament.312 
 
The EU budget should support the  
launch of a series of technological 
moonshot projects where EU industry  
is already strong.
Inclusion and fairness
When it comes to growth and innovation performance, 
social and spatial imbalances have already materialised. It 
is possible that the strategy for a successful transition into 
industry 4.0 has unintended consequences that will further 
perpetuate these inequalities.313 An EU industrial strategy 
that supports digitalisation and the energy transition must 
pay special attention to the most vulnerable areas, sectors 
and social classes. Industrial competitiveness at its best 
can contribute to the promotion of the well-being of EU 
citizens, and enhance social and territorial cohesion and 
solidarity among EU countries.
Tackling unintended consequences and facing polarisation risks
The ongoing industrial transition, as well as the policy 
provisions that would support EU industry in the 
process, may have uneven impacts. An example is the 
disproportionately negative effect automation and 
changes in the labour market have had on low-income 
workers, who face a higher risk of losing out. The 
increasing demand for knowledge-intensive jobs raises 
the skill premium, benefitting those who are already at 
the top of the wage distribution. Job polarisation and 
wage inequality may thus increase if industrial policy 
does not envisage counterbalancing measures. 
The geographic dimension of the transition arises 
from the fact that structural characteristics of regional 
economies determine whether they are likely to benefit 
or lose out from changes to a primarily technological 
and interconnected service-oriented industry. For 
example, some places may rely more on traditional 
manufacturing sectors that are likely to be robotised 
or outsourced to other countries; some may lack the 
capacity to transform their industrial sectors into more 
high-value activities; some may rely heavily on fossil 
fuels and face higher costs for the energy transition. 
The agglomeration of economic activity and prosperity 
in specific centres of production, often around large 
cities, is already underway and is likely to continue since 
technology, innovation and services tend to benefit 
from the accumulation of activities.314 Winner-takes-all 
dynamics are emerging and are particularly present in 
the digital economy where, for example, a couple of very 
large firms dominate the global market and operate in 
concentrated areas. The flipside of the coin is that there 
are many places and social groups that do not participate 
in these dynamics and are thus excluded from the 
benefits generated by the fourth industrial revolution.
The flipside of the coin is that there  
are many places and social groups are 
excluded from the benefits generated by 
the fourth industrial revolution.
Ensuring inclusiveness 
Firstly, these social and geographic imbalances may be 
further reinforced if the EU industrial strategy merely 
focuses on major strategic, high-value sectors at the 
innovation and productivity frontier, and does not ensure 
that more traditional activities and all local economies 
have their place within the strategy itself. The industrial 
strategy should acknowledge its potential in increasing 
imbalances, assess these differences and estimate its 
impact on different social classes and territories.
Secondly, to smooth out social imbalances, coordination 
with education and training policy is crucial, as already 
mentioned. The entire workforce should possess the 
INFOBOX 4: The Digital Europe programme – A great 
added-value for Europe
The DEP is a €9.2 billion programme proposed by the 
Commission as part of the next 2021-27 MFF. It would become 
the first funding programme specifically focused on building the 
EU’s strategic digital capacities and facilitating the deployment of 
digital technologies. It supports the funding of high-performance 
computing (€2.7 billion), AI (€2.5 billion), cybersecurity (€2 billion), 
advanced digital skills (€700 million) and deployment (€1.3 billion).  
An excellent added-value for boosting the digital industry in 
Europe, it can provide some much-needed support for developing 
technological sovereignty in Europe. Its budget is to be agreed 
upon within the MFF negotiations and EU member states should 
consider increasing its financial envelope. To play on the current 
political momentum, it could be renamed the ‘EU fund for 
technological sovereignty’.
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necessary skills to embrace technological change 
and innovations in the workplace, whether they are 
employed in a modern or ‘mundane and regular’ sector, 
or not. Special focus should be placed on those whose 
occupation is at high risk of automation, as well as those 
who will require retraining in their career. 
Thirdly, the industrial strategy should capitalise on 
the diversity of economic structures across European 
territories. This is a strength, as it allows for the 
diversification of economic activities across sectors 
as well the creation of intra-EU value chains and 
interregional cooperation. To do so, the strategy should 
include all regions and ensure that each territory’s 
endowments and specificities are exploited and 
contribute to economic growth along with the industrial 
transformation. It should avoid one-size-fits-all policies 
and instead adopt a tailormade, ‘place-sensitive’ 
approach that matches the capacity and characteristics 
of each region.315 Building on initiatives such as the 
Smart Specialisation strategies, local development, 
innovation and investment strategies should be used 
to enhance local opportunities and reach untapped 
potential. This would ensure that each local economy 
takes part in the industrial transition to its full potential.
Of course, not every EU region can become a global 
leader in high-tech and/or -value sectors. Indeed, places 
with relatively low physical and human capacity and 
ore traditional economic structures cannot compete 
with the most dynamic and established EU centres of 
innovative industrial activities. That being said, while 
promoting the excellence of the latter is important, 
neither should the European industrial strategy 
neglect the former. Though such regions may be far 
from the frontier, they still constitute a large part of 
local economies and so must be brought along for the 
transformative ride.
The industrial strategy should adopt a 
tailormade, ‘place-sensitive’ approach  
that matches the capacity and 
characteristics of each region.
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Chapter 4: Recommendations – Policy aims  
for an Industry Action Plan for the EU
RECOMMENDATION 1: MAKE THE SINGLE  
MARKET WORK, EQUIPPED WITH A MODERN 
COMPETITION POLICY
 
The European Single Market represents the EU’s 
strongest asset in maintaining and restoring industrial 
competitiveness. The Single Market is central to 
establishing European value chains and ensuring that 
EU companies are well equipped to link into GVCs. Any 
EU industrial policy should place the revitalisation of 
the Single Market at its core. A new programme for 
the Single Market should aim to prioritise services, 
standardisation, more robust enforcement and better 
regulation. Within the Single Market, well-functioning 
and strong competition rules are fundamental to the 
development of a healthy and resilient industrial 
ecosystem. For this to take place, however, all companies 
operating within and with the Single Market – no matter 
their origin and size – must be bound by EU competition 
rules. EU competition policy should rapidly adjust to the 
realities of global competition and be fit for the age of 
the digital economy.
Any EU industrial policy should place  
the revitalisation of the Single Market  
at its core.
q  Launch a 2022 Single Market masterplan for Europe. 
The EU should define a new action plan for the Single 
Market with a reform programme and concrete 
objectives to be achieved by 2022 – exactly thirty years 
after the creation of the Single Market and following 
the strategy set out in the 1992 Programme. The 2022 
Action Plan should be structured as a list of reforms 
and initiatives to be agreed upon as a package deal by 
the Council, Commission and Parliament. It should be 
Overarching goals  
for an EU Industry 
Action Plan Challenges to be tackled Five policy aims Key recommendations
1. Sustainability
2. Competitiveness
3.  Strategic 
autonomy
q  Rise in protectionism
q  Distorted competition  
due to third-country 
initiatives
q  Demanufacturing  
and loss of jobs  
in industry
q  Digital disruption  
and automation
q  Dependence on foreign 
technology
q  Need for critical raw 
materials
q  Achieving climate  
neutrality by 2050
q  Increased competition  
over ‘global talents’
q  The skills gap
q  Regional disparities
q  Lack of investments  
in R&I
q  Enforcement of EU  
rules within the Single 
Market
1.  Make the Single  
Market work, equipped 
with a modern  
competition policy
q  Launch a 2022 Single Market masterplan for Europe 
q  Establish decentralised enforcement bodies
q  A Small Business Act 2.0
q  Boost services within the Single Market
q  Establish an independent competition authority 
q  Ensure flexibility on state aid rules (matching-clause, IPCEIs)
2.  Better innovation  
policy and  
technological  
sovereignty
q  Increase funds allocated to DEP, InvestEU, CEF 
q  Earmark Horizon Europe funds for  
industrial innovation
q  Set up strong governance for IPCEIs
q  Launch a new strategy on digitising EU industry sustainably 
q  Encourage the creation of data trusts
q  Strengthen ENISA
3.  Act strategically  
and enforce  
reciprocity 
q  Strengthen FDI screenings at EU and member state level 
q  Adopt an International Public Procurement tool
q  Enforce sustainability within EU FTAs
q  Champion WTO reforms
q  Better enforce sustainability at EU border
q  Enhance the EU’s economic diplomacy and access to raw 
materials 
4.  Ensure a fair and  
inclusive industrial 
transition 
q  Optimise the synergies between  
EU funds
q  Democratise access to digital skills 
q  Support and encourage local industrial strategies 
programmes
q  Develop common EU educational  
programmes for AI and emerging  
technologies
5. Climate-proof industry
q  Create a favourable framework for low-emission  
electricity 
q  Introduce emission performance  
standards
q  Create a business case for ultra-low carbon processes
q  Create lead markets for low-emission solutions
q  Create a market for secondary raw materials
q  Support industrial symbiosis
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integral to the EU’s industrial policy. It is time to end 
the artificial distinction between so-called ‘Friends 
of the Single Market’ and ‘Friends of the Industry’. A 
list of suggested initiatives can be found in the EPC 
Discussion Paper, “Making the Single Market work: 
Launching a 2022 masterplan for Europe”.316
q  Establish decentralised enforcement bodies. The 
next Commission should look into the possibility 
of setting up national enforcement bodies in each 
member state, to help monitor the application of 
Single Market rules and initiate proceedings before 
national courts. A more decentralised enforcement 
system would help bring the Single Market closer to 
EU citizens and remove the barriers to trade that go 
unnoticed at a higher level by the Commission (e.g. 
technical barriers to trade, additional paperwork 
or legal ‘gold-plating’ when transposing EU law). 
Decentralised enforcement bodies would supplement 
rather than replace the role currently played by the 
Commission and could help bridge the gap between 
EU and national legal orders.317 This could be crucial 
in ensuring that products imported into the EU from 
third countries also comply with EU rules, especially 
regarding safety and sustainability. 
With the increasing servicification of 
manufacturing, the EU market for services 
cannot remain as underdeveloped as it 
currently is. 
q  Introduce a Small Business Act 2.0. The EU should 
introduce a second Small Business Act to reinforce 
the ‘think small first’ principle and establish a real 
SME-test within the better regulation agenda. A Small 
Business Act 2.0 should offer clear guidelines on 
how to implement an SME test for all relevant Single 
Market legislation to better assess the possible costs 
and benefits of new legislation on SMEs. The Act 
should take a more innovative approach to regulation 
(e.g. regulating with the ‘lifecycle’ of start-ups and 
SMEs in mind), thus easing the regulatory burden 
on SMEs around important ‘life stages’ such as 
scaling-up, recruitment, relocation and such.
q  Set up a single one-stop-shop. The EU should aim to 
set up a single one-stop-shop in each member state, 
to provide industries and businesses with clarity and 
a better overview of the rules and administrative 
requirements they must abide by, and how. This 
would allow the several Single Market contact points 
that currently exist (i.e. under the Services Directive; 
the Mutual Recognition Regulation; the Recognition 
of Professional Qualifications Directive; and the 
Enforcement Directive on Posted Workers) to better 
coordinate their decisions and replies.318 This should 
be streamlined with the role played by the Single 
Digital Gateway in making access to information and 
administrative procedures more userfriendly. 
q  Revive European standardisation. The Commission 
should review its approach to European 
standardisation, thus allowing for more industry-led 
standardisation and innovation to take place. The 
Commission should reduce administrative burdens, 
avoid an over-regulatory approach to standardisation 
and increase the attractiveness for industry wishing 
to participate in the standardisation process. These 
efforts are imperative if European standards are to 
keep up with the current pace of innovation and 
development of new digital technologies worldwide. 
q  Boost services within the Single Market. With the 
increasing servicification of manufacturing, the EU 
market for services cannot remain as underdeveloped 
as it currently is. The Commission should actively 
include the free movement of services and the 
better enforcement of the Services Directive in 
any future EU industrial strategy. The services 
notification procedure should be further reviewed and 
strengthened, including the possibility of granting 
the Commission the right to take binding decisions on 
non-compliance. The Commission should send cases 
regarding possible breaches of the Services Directive 
to the ECJ more systematically.319
q  Adopt an ‘integral value chain’ approach when 
regulating. The European Commission should 
assess the impact of new EU rules on the entirety 
of European value chains more actively before 
regulating. Regulating one part of the value chain 
can often result in unwanted repercussions or 
consequences in another part of the value chain, 
even if done with the best intentions (e.g. out of 
environmental, safety concerns). An ‘integral value 
chain’ assessment should be included in the EU’s 
better regulation agenda.
q  Establish an independent competition authority. The 
EU should consider establishing an independent 
competition authority, building on existing examples 
in several member states and third countries. This 
could allow for a clearer separation of EU competition 
policy from the enforcement of competition rules, 
as both currently fall under the responsibility of 
the Commission. This could also help foster greater 
transparency and clarity around state aid and  
merger decisions.320
The EU should consider establishing an 
independent competition authority.
q  Set up a high-level group on competition policy. 
The Commission should set up a high-level expert 
group to assess how EU competition policy could be 
modernised to better reflect the realities of the digital 
economy and global competition. EU competition 
policy should be regularly updated, in full compliance 
with WTO rules, to ensure that European and foreign 
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firms compete on an equal basis within the Single 
Market and thus allow for a global level playing field. 
It should also assess how competition enforcement 
could be modernised to keep up with rapid 
developments in the digital sector.321
q  Allow	more	flexibility	on	state	aid	rules. There 
should be greater awareness of globalised product 
markets and international competition while also 
ensuring compatibility with the WTO framework. The 
Commission should put forward clearer guidelines 
and support better use of already existing tools to 
support EU companies deal with subsidised global 
competitors. There is scope for increasing the 
effectiveness of the IPCEI and the so-called ‘matching 
clause’322 in R&D, which allows for some exemption 
from state aid constraints in the presence of a 
subsidised third-country competitor. To incentivise 
the use of this clause, the Commission should speed 
up assessment procedures.
RECOMMENDATION 2: BETTER INNOVATION POLICY 
AND TECHNOLOGICAL SOVEREIGNTY
 
Given the maturity of EU economies, growth must be 
sustained through high-value segments of GVCs. For 
this to happen, keeping industry innovative is critical. 
Currently, however, the EU has been investing less in 
R&D (as a percentage of GDP) than global competitors. 
It also faces a particular challenge in translating 
knowledge into marketable goods and services. At the 
same time, Europe’s industrial strategy will need to 
embrace digitalisation and technological progress. 
The rise of robotics, AI, IoT, Blockchain, 5G and super-
computers represents an excellent opportunity to 
reinvent industrial production and business models, 
and thereby re-establish European competitiveness. 
Being at the forefront of these developments would 
also allow the EU to ensure that digitalisation helps 
to address its societal, environmental and security 
challenges and meet its safety, sustainability and 
ethical standards. Additional regulation will have to be 
developed with great care to avoid unnecessary barriers 
to the free flow of data and ensure that digital rules are 
equally applicable to European as to foreign companies 
operating within the Single Market.
Keeping industry innovative is critical. 
q  Significantly	increase	funds	allocated	to	the	DEP,	
InvestEU and CEF. If EU member states are serious 
about industrial leadership and technological 
sovereignty, suggested funds for the DEP (€9.2 
billion), InvestEU (€14.7 billion) and CEF (€42.3 
billion, but including only €3 billion for digital 
envelop) should be significantly increased under the 
proposed 2021-27 MFF. The DEP should be increased 
by at least 50% in order to match the proposed 
InvestEU and CEF funds. It could also be renamed the 
‘Technological Sovereignty Fund for Europe’. These 
funds should be kept separate and distinct under 
the MFF section of EFSI and not be merged with 
other funds like Horizon Europe. ‘European strategic 
investments’ should target and be earmarked for 
technological moonshot initiatives, including high-
performance and cloud computing, cybersecurity, 
advanced manufacturing, AI for circularity (e.g. better 
design, waste management, recycling, retrieving raw 
materials), sustainability and health. 
If EU member states are serious about 
industrial leadership and technological 
sovereignty, suggested funds for the DEP, 
InvestEU and CEF should be significantly 
increased under the proposed MFF.
q  Earmark more Horizon Europe funds for (industrial) 
innovation. The main beneficiaries of the Framework 
Programme are universities and research institutions, 
which tend to focus on basic academic research. 
Horizon Europe should be expanded to invest in 
close-to-market innovation equally, targeting both 
firms doing in-house R&I as well as those trying to 
commercialise and deploy recent innovations. The 
European Innovation Council’s proposed budget of 
€10 billion is only 10% of the total Horizon Europe 
budget – it should be considerably increased.
The Commission should encourage and 
define guidelines for regulatory sandboxes.
q  Create a horizontal MFF indicator for innovation 
funding. There must be a common definition, 
tracking methodology and impact assessment of 
EU innovation funding. At present, EU support for 
innovation across the different EU programmes is not 
commonly defined and is often not clearly reported 
either.323 For the MFF to effectively encourage 
innovation, it must be possible to clearly identify 
related funding and assess the impact, because budget 
allocations do not indicate actual results.
q  Set up a strong governance structure for the IPCEI. 
The EU should set up a strong governance structure, 
both within the Commission (e.g. inter-service task 
force) and the Council (e.g. a working party within 
the Competitiveness Council) to identify and promote 
strategic value chains and IPCEIs. A permanent 
successor to the Strategic Forum should be appointed 
the role of supporting the Commission in identifying 
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future strategic value chains and implementing the 
Forum’s recommendations within six strategic value 
chains: autonomous vehicles, cybersecurity, hydrogen 
technologies, industrial IoT, low CO2 emission 
industry and smart health.
q  Create European regulatory ‘sandboxes’. The Commission 
should encourage and define guidelines for regulatory 
sandboxes, allowing the industry to develop innovative 
products or services with partial or total exemption 
from regular rules, but still monitored by public 
authorities. This would allow regulators to protect the 
public interest while still providing an environment for 
testing and failing, and avoiding overregulation. The 
guidelines within the sandboxes could include sector-
specific, minimum requirements to be respected. Even 
if regulatory sandboxes are mostly associated with 
financial technology, they have also proved useful 
within other fields (e.g. energy, data, technology). 
Regulatory sandboxes could also be linked to specific 
testbed facilities, which are usually equipped with 
machinery and computer programmes. 
The EU should set up pilot projects to 
boost cooperation between universities 
and firms in major sectors. 
q  Encourage the development of testbed facilities in 
Europe. The EU should encourage and invest in 
the development of testbeds for the development 
of emerging technologies. Testbeds are research 
facilities usually equipped with machinery and 
computer programmes which allow for the testing 
and development of new products. They can reduce 
risks and boost rapid innovation, and are especially 
important for SMEs and start-ups that often lack 
the resources or facilities to try out new products or 
solutions. Projects like Sweden’s RISE – a national 
programme operating around a hundred testbeds324 – 
should be encouraged in other member states and at 
the European level. 
q  Set up partnerships between academia and the private 
sector for commercialisation. In avoiding that innovation 
gets lost before the commercialisation phase, the 
EU should set up pilot projects to boost cooperation 
between universities and firms in major sectors. These 
collaborative projects would facilitate the market uptake 
of research outcomes and create stronger links between 
the two worlds. The partnerships could take the form of 
enhancing student and faculty exchange and ‘corporate 
visits’ via Erasmus+, for example, and provide financial 
support to research projects carried out by university-
firm ‘duos’ that aim to commercialise the outcomes from 
the start.
q  Establish a structured consultation process on IPR. 
The Commission should set up a structured dialogue 
with industry representatives to find the balance 
between open innovation and IP protection. The 
aim should be to design a framework that ensures 
the broad availability of partially publicly-funded 
research outcomes as well as concrete benefits for 
private investors. Particular attention should be paid 
to ensuring that IP protection is granted quickly and 
that delays are avoided. Innovation in fast-changing 
environments is constrained if bringing products to 
the market is slow. 
Support for digital technologies should  
be made conditional: the aim must  
be to promote the development and 
deployment of solutions with a limited 
environmental footprint. 
q  Accelerate	the	setup	of	the	Unified	Patent	Court. 
The Unified Patent Court (UPC) is a proposed 
international common patent court for all EU member 
states. Already approved in 2012, unitary patent 
protection and a uniform patent litigation system 
would help to simplify the EU’s fragmented patent 
protection system and reduce costs linked to R&I. 
However, because of a delay in the ratification process 
in Germany and uncertainties surrounding Brexit, the 
UPC has not yet been able to become effective. An 
agreement should be found that would allow the UK 
to remain within the unitary patent system regardless 
of the Brexit outcome, including a possible review of 
the UPC Agreement and the locations of the courts. 
q  Launch a new strategy for the sustainable digitisation 
of EU industry. The Commission should launch a 
new strategy for the digitalisation of industry and 
manufacturing in Europe. It should include funds 
dedicated to the deployment and promotion of the 
uptake of new technologies within the DEP, Horizon 
Europe and InvestEU. However, support for digital 
technologies should be made conditional: the aim 
must be to promote the development and deployment 
of solutions with a limited environmental footprint 
and ensure that they are used to address the likes of 
sustainability and societal challenges. In addition 
to R&I investments under the 2021-27 MFF, the 
EU should especially support start-ups and SMEs 
in using digital technologies to develop and bring 
products and services that are beneficial for health, 
environment and security onto the market.
q  Encourage the creation of data trusts. The EU should 
encourage the creation of data trusts or data spaces 
to stimulate data sharing within various sectors 
(e.g. health, food, textiles, energy, automotive). Data 
trusts have been mentioned as new data governance 
frameworks that would provide for secure ways of 
sharing data and protect against abuses325 and would 
work as a cooperation platform between organisations 
with data and AI developers using data to develop new 
technological solutions. Contractual arrangements 
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could ensure that organisations giving away data 
benefit from doing so, for example by gaining IPR 
shares of the resulting technology.326 The EU should 
actively engage in creating linkages between national 
data-sharing systems to enable R&I.
q  Define	a	list	of	priorities	for	funding	key	technologies.	
The Commission should define a list of top strategic 
technologies to be developed in Europe and thus 
prioritised throughout EU funding, assessed by their 
societal and strategic importance. An initial list  
could comprise the six KETs as identified by the  
High-level Strategy Group on Industrial Technologies: 
advanced manufacturing technologies; materials and 
nanotechnology; photonics, micro- and nanoelectronics; 
advanced manufacturing technologies; AI; and digital 
security and connectivity.327
q  Establish a European AI university. The EU should 
establish a European university or research institute for 
new emerging technologies such as AI, in partnership 
with a network of European industries. An alliance of 
European universities and institutes working on AI 
should also be established, in which the European AI 
university could play a coordinating role.
The EU should encourage the creation  
of data trusts or data spaces to stimulate 
data sharing.
q  Strengthen the EU Cybersecurity Agency. The EU 
should strengthen the mandate and budget of the 
EU Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA). Cybersecurity 
and the reliability of digital technologies is crucial 
if citizens and industry are to trust and make use of 
digital solutions fully. The Commission has proposed 
a ‘European Cybersecurity Industrial, Technology 
and Research Competence Centre and Network’. It 
is paramount that the Council and Parliament agree 
on these proposals swiftly and consider whether the 
mandates and the budget allocated to these centres 
should be further strengthened. 
RECOMMENDATION 3: ACT STRATEGICALLY AND 
ENFORCE RECIPROCITY
 
The current context will require the EU to think more 
strategically about promoting industrial competitiveness 
and responding to global challenges. Third countries 
such as the US, China and India do not shy away from 
adopting protective or protectionist initiatives under 
the banner of industrial policy. A European response 
should be based on an open economy and free trade, but 
Europe cannot remain naïve in granting market access 
to foreign industry that does not play by the same rules. 
Tools within different EU agendas, such as trade and the 
Single Market, should be better exploited to increase 
the strategic autonomy of Europe. In acting more 
strategically, the EU should also be smarter with the 
resources it has within its borders and use innovative 
solutions and digital technologies for this aim, as well as 
secure access to raw materials from third countries.328
The EU should make the ratification and 
implementation of the Paris Agreement a 
pre-condition to concluding FTAs.
q  Strengthen FDI screenings at the EU and member state 
level. All EU member states should put FDI screening 
mechanisms in place, including binding measures 
in case FDIs represent an external threat to the 
security or public order of the Union. FDI screenings 
at the EU level should go beyond merely facilitating 
the exchange of information; instead, extensive 
cooperation should be put into place, and a common 
understanding of what constitutes a threat to 
national and union security should be developed. The 
weight of the Commission’s (current) ‘non-binding’ 
opinions should be strengthened.
q  Adopt an International Public Procurement tool. The 
proposal for an ‘International Procurement Instrument’ 
(IPI) should be reviewed, updated and adopted as soon 
as possible by the Council and Parliament. The IPI is 
a tool that could improve European industries’ access 
to public contracts in third countries. Still not adopted 
by the Council and Parliament, the Instrument would 
allow for the leveraging of reciprocal market access by 
restricting third countries’ access to European public 
markets if necessary.
q  Enforce and monitor sustainability within EU FTAs. 
The EU should monitor and enforce the Trade and 
Sustainable Development chapters it has sought 
to include in its FTAs more effectively. In cases 
where a partner country does not comply with these 
provisions despite enhanced cooperation through 
dispute settlement mechanisms, the EU should be 
able to suspend an FTA or adopt sanctions as a  
last resort. The EU should make the ratification  
and implementation of the Paris Agreement a  
pre-condition to concluding FTAs.
q  Champion WTO reforms. The EU should remain strongly 
committed to the multilateral trading system and its 
reform agenda. The EU should work with all partners to 
improve the efficiency, transparency and fairness of the 
WTO, including ensuring that WTO countries notify 
new subsidies and implement the WTO Agreement 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. The EU 
should continue to work with likeminded countries 
and convince others of the need to reform the WTO, 
including its Appellate Body, and to improve the 
regulation of the use of industrial subsidies. Temporary 
alternatives outside of the WTO would possibly need to 
be found in the event of an Appellate Body breakdown. 
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Such solutions, however, should be temporary by 
default and made conditional on the inactivity of the 
multilateral system’s dispute settlement. 
q  Enhance Europe’s economic diplomacy. A more strategic 
agenda for Europe should not, however, mean a 
more isolationist Europe. The EU should enhance its 
economic diplomacy in technology, innovation and 
industry, to build a stronger platform for cooperation 
with third countries and through international 
organisations. Several areas will require increased 
global cooperation, such as ethical AI; the governance 
of emerging digital technologies; secure data 
transfers; cybersecurity; and access to raw materials. 
While many international fora can be adapted and 
empowered to deal with such emerging areas, others 
may have to be established. 
q  Better enforcement of EU sustainability rules and 
standards at the border. The EU must improve its 
market surveillance and enforcement compliance. 
European industry is required to comply with strict 
regulations on safety, standards and sustainability 
while competitors are often permitted to enter the 
EU market without having to comply with the same 
rules or strict enforcement mechanisms. New ways to 
assess foreign firms’ compliance with EU rules should 
be developed across sectors, and more effective trade 
enforcement tools should be developed in order to 
block the Single Market off from firms that do not 
respect these rules.
A more strategic agenda for Europe should 
not mean a more isolationist Europe. 
q  Secure access to materials. The EU should map the 
future demand for raw materials, develop dedicated 
diplomacy to secure access and enhance circularity 
to reduce external dependency. Securing access 
to critical materials will require adopting a more 
flexible approach externally: while the aim must be 
to build on multilateral cooperation, the EU must 
also be prepared to engage in dialogue with upstream 
countries when needed. As Chinese domestic demand 
for rare earth is set to expand rapidly, bilateral 
dialogue should be deepened with Australia, South 
Africa, Canada and Mercosur countries. In order to 
limit exposure to external supply shocks internally, 
critical materials within the economy should be 
retained in the economcy: via tracking and tracing, 
separate collection and recycling of products and 
components that contain critical materials.
q  Create a market for circular products and services. 
PP should be used to incentivise the development 
and deployment of circular products and services. 
Determining the most adequate product/service 
must be supported by lifecycle assessments, product 
environmental footprints and pertinent product/
service labels. Taxation can also be used to incentivise 
smarter use of resources, by removing VAT from 
recycled materials that would make sustainable 
business models more competitive, for example, and 
discourage unsustainable practices (e.g. landfilling, 
incineration). Agreeing on the definition of waste (i.e. 
end-of-waste criteria) and developing quality standards 
for secondary materials could also make recycled 
materials more competitive than virgin materials.
RECOMMENDATION 4: ENSURE A FAIR AND 
INCLUSIVE INDUSTRIAL TRANSITION
 
Ensuring that no worker or region is left behind 
should remain a fundamental goal of any European 
industrial initiative. EU citizens and businesses across 
the EU should have equal opportunities to profit from 
industrial transformations. The EU should make sure 
that the transition towards more digital, innovative 
and sustainable industries does not lead to further 
unemployment, exclusion or social and geographic 
polarisation – even if job displacement is inevitable.
The EU should make sure that the 
transition towards more digital, innovative 
and sustainable industries does not lead to 
further unemployment, exclusion or social 
and geographic polarisation.
q  Optimise the synergies between the preventive and 
corrective objectives of EU funds. several EU funds 
proposed under the MFF 2021-2027 will aim to 
enhance labour market participation through various 
measures, such as the European Social Fund Plus 
(ESF+) and the European Globalisation Adjustment 
Fund (EGF). The ESF+ and the EGF will follow 
complementary objectives: the ESF+ will mainly have 
a preventive mission while the EGF assists vulnerable 
workers. Having the two aspects covered by EU funds 
as well as the broader scope of the EGF is both relevant 
and promising. However, the complementarity of 
the two funds will only be optimal if the ESF+ is 
underpinned by a long-term territorial strategy on 
industrial restructuring, where upskilling workers 
for digitalisation and emerging technologies plays a 
central role. There is also potential for better synergies 
between Horizon Europe and the European Structural 
and Investment Funds (ESIF). Particular attention 
should be given to the potential use of ESIF to uptake 
and diffuse Horizon Europe results. 
q  Democratise access to digital skills. Over 40% of 
Europeans still lack basic digital skills.329 Furthermore, 
it appears that digital skills are unequally distributed 
within society. For instance, there is a gendered digital 
skill gap of about 4 percentage points, and which has 
remained constant since 2015. In the case of senior 
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workers, only 41% of them have basic or above-average 
digital skills. In addition, access to proper training 
and lifelong learning is likely to become increasingly 
difficult for non-standard workers, in particular those 
who have no public entity to which training requests 
can be addressed. Therefore, the EU needs to ensure 
that all workers, including the self-employed and 
those taking part in the platform economy, have 
access to adequate training. In this respect, this must 
include online training, which is often more flexible 
than formal academic education. Thus, European 
universities need to be incentivised to develop their 
offer of online courses.
Cooperation among European 
universities as well as with industry  
must be strengthened and encouraged 
more actively. 
q  Make digital skills an integral part of regional 
development strategies. A digitally skilled workforce 
is crucial if businesses are to remain competitive 
and make better use of emerging technologies. 
Therefore, public authorities need to find new ways 
to incentivise investment in human capital, while 
ensuring that the strategy benefits all workers 
and territories. This strategy needs to be closely 
coordinated with the business sector, which knows 
best what skills are needed on the labour market. To 
ensure that businesses contribute their fair share in 
national efforts, new incentives should be created. 
For instance, investing in human capital and training 
in digital technologies should be rewarded by tax 
incentives. In the case of SMEs – which have limited 
capacity to invest in training programmes –, local and 
regional authorities should organise joint training 
programmes through their chambers of commerce, 
for example, thus allowing for economies of scale 
and transfers of knowledge across industries. Such a 
territorial re- and upskilling strategy should become 
an integral part of the smart specialisation strategy 
and the upcoming operational programmes that will 
form part of the Cohesion Policy in 2021-2027. 
The EU should support all regional 
authorities in the formulation of their  
own strategy for industrial transition.
q  Develop common EU educational programmes for AI and 
emerging technologies. The EU needs to understand 
better where (i.e. in which industrial sector and 
region) AI talents are concentrated and to what extent 
new technologies such as AI, IoT and blockchain 
are integrated into educational programmes. The 
relevance of new technologies cuts across levels 
of responsibility, types of jobs and sectors. Thus, it 
must become part of all educational and training 
programmes, regardless of the beneficiaries’ level of 
education and occupational sector. Despite the EU’s 
limited competences in the area of education and 
lifelong learning, the EU has an important role to play 
in incentivising reforms in the education system. To 
this end, the EU should develop a monitoring system 
highlighting how digital skills and new technologies 
are embedded in national educational programmes. 
In addition, the EU should have a few top-ranking 
universities that lead in new technologies. Cooperation 
among European universities as well as with industry 
must be strengthened and encouraged more actively. 
The EU could promote the user-developed models of 
responsible data use and stakeholder engagement. 
q  Promote	a	human	cost-benefit	analysis	of	industrial	
transformations. New technologies are often used and 
spread regardless of their impact on jobs and workers. 
Practices among businesses but also within the public 
sector as regards the ex-ante impact assessment of 
new technologies varies significantly. While some 
integrate the human impact, others do not. The EU 
is not particularly competent in this field, so it would 
be extremely useful to have a European framework 
based on a specific methodology with major criteria, 
to guide employers on whether the application of new 
technologies would be positive or negative from a 
human-centred growth perspective. Such a framework 
should also help employers and industries understand 
and anticipate how technologies might lead to 
unemployment and displacement. 
q  Critically assess past and future policies for inequality. 
The EU should carry out a deep and critical analysis 
of its policies and their (unintended) negative 
effects, for example, on perpetuating inequality and 
polarisation, especially at the regional level.330 It 
should lead to the acknowledgement that generally 
accepted assumptions (e.g. the automatic diffusion 
of wealth and innovation spillovers) may be 
misconceived, and that negative consequences (e.g. 
the concentration of wealth and activities in already 
advanced areas) may have been underestimated. This 
process should be followed by an ex-ante assessment 
of the industrial strategy provisions and estimation of 
potential negative distributional impacts.
q  Support and encourage local industrial strategies. To 
avoid one-size-fits-all policies that could create 
unintended, uneven consequences, the EU should 
support all regional authorities in the formulation 
of their own strategy for industrial transition. After 
an assessment of local challenges and opportunities, 
it may transpire that these strategies should not 
necessarily focus on sectors at the innovation 
frontier or technologies deemed as strategic, but 
rather envisage tailored instruments to improve and 
strengthen existing industrial activities. This can 
include, for example, investment for incremental 
innovation of traditional industry towards a more 
sustainable, energy-efficient production. These 
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policies can build on Smart Specialisation strategies 
as well as take a broader approach, linking different 
areas such as access to capital, innovation, skills and 
training, and infrastructure investment. The role of 
the EU should be one of capacity building, technical 
support and coordination to ensure the ownership of 
the strategy by local authorities.
q  Use cooperation as the driver for regional development. 
To counterbalance geographic disparities, the 
EU should provide strategic guidance to foster 
cooperation among regions. This should build on 
existing initiatives, such as those of the Smart 
Specialisation policy agenda or the proposed changes 
to Interreg (or European Territorial Co-operation) 
to foster interregional innovation investment.331 
Importantly, interregional cooperation should 
not reinforce the current agglomeration logic by 
strengthening the existing clusters in the most 
dynamic centres of production. Rather, it should 
‘break the bubble’ by bringing together actors from 
different regions and sectors. This would facilitate 
the diffusion of industrial activity, the spillover 
of technology and innovation and the creation of 
new business networks and relationships, as well as 
intra-EU value chains.
RECOMMENDATION 5: CLIMATE PROOF INDUSTRY
 
In alignment with the UN’s Paris Agreement, the 
European Commission has proposed a strategy for 
achieving a climate-neutral EU by 2050 – which most EU 
member states have already agreed upon. It is essential 
that a future-oriented European industrial strategy 
is in line with this vision, placing sustainability and 
sustainable industries at its core. As the level of climate 
ambitions differs across the world, it is important to 
ensure that the EU’s strict rules on climate neutrality 
and sustainability do not result in a global competitive 
disadvantage for EU industry. In this regard, protective 
clauses such as carbon border adjustments ought to be 
considered. Simultaneously, a more assertive EU foreign 
policy should strive to develop and enforce international 
rules and standards on climate neutrality that will 
ensure a global level playing field. In many ways, 
European industries are already leading this endeavour, 
but EU policymakers can support this endeavour and 
further accelerate the transition.
The EU must put its money where its 
mouth is. 
q  Reward sustainable businesses. The EU must 
ensure that its framework conditions and support 
mechanisms reward businesses whose processes, 
products and services contribute to climate neutrality 
and the wider sustainability agenda. Creating the 
conditions to succeed in this transition requires a 
supportive policy framework, financial incentives, 
improved infrastructure, and targets to encourage 
investments in needed innovation. Defining a  
short-term action plan for 2025 could provide the 
industry with some of the necessary certainty and 
milestones to jump into action.
q  Align spending towards climate neutrality. The EU 
must put its money where its mouth is. In Europe, 
around €112 billion were allocated annually to 
the production and consumption of fossil fuels 
between 2014 and 2016.332 Smart spending requires 
firstly putting an end to subsidies that are evidently 
harmful to the environment and climate. If the EU 
and its member states are serious about achieving 
a new climate-neutral economic model by 2050, 
this requires huge investments in the energy sector, 
including in renewables, to improve electricity storage, 
transmission capacity, energy efficiency as well as to 
reduce the climate footprint of agriculture, transport 
and construction sectors. They should be targeted to 
solutions that can demonstrate full compatibility with 
a sustainable, climate-neutral future. The EU could 
use the MFF to attract additional public and private 
investments for climate-friendly projects, for example. 
q  Create a favourable framework to access low-emission 
electricity. Deepening and completing a Single Market 
for electricity in the EU will be essential to reducing 
and aligning costs, and this will require harmonisation 
in support schemes, carbon price floors, capacity 
mechanisms and enhanced interconnections. 
To encourage a switch to electrification while 
simultaneously avoiding indirect emissions, corporate 
power purchase agreements (PPAs) should be 
incentivised. These contracts have the advantage 
of encouraging a parallel shift towards renewable 
energy in both the industrial and energy sectors. The 
Commission should underline the benefits of PPAs and 
promote their EU-wide standardisation.
q  Introduce emission performance standards (EPS) to 
favour investment in alternative energy feedstock 
and zero-emission processes. Under the Industrial 
Emissions Directive (IED), emission limits are based 
on BAT.333 Similarly, emission performance standards 
are also applied to passenger cars, ideally acting as a 
driver for the expansion of electromobility. The IED’s 
scope could be extended beyond pollutants to include 
GHGs – currently excluded as covered by the ETS. 
This would provide a strong boost for the long-term 
uptake of low-carbon BAT by 2050 and avoid a lock-in 
effect. In between BAT reviews, the ETS would provide 
mid-term incentives for the industry to introduce 
low-carbon techniques. EPS should provide a clear 
sectoral roadmap with sunset clauses for the phase-out 
of GHG-emitting technologies. When connecting EPS 
with low emission requirements, the EU should duly 
consider the interaction between market-based and 
regulatory instruments. Any additional extensions of 
the EPS to include low-carbon requirements should not 
undermine the incentives provided by the ETS for the 
industry to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050. Besides 
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extending the binding legislative scope of the IED, it is 
also worth considering other options, such as including 
low-carbon requirements in the BAT reference 
documents (BREFs) to a greater extent in order to 
facilitate the uptake of low-carbon BAT by the industry. 
Arguably, climate neutrality can be ensured by 
exploiting the full potential of the EU’s policy toolbox, 
while avoiding inconsistencies and unnecessary 
regulatory burden and tapping the synergies between 
different instruments.
q  Make the most of EU funding and innovation 
instruments including InvestEU, CEF, Horizon Europe, 
and the EU ETS’ Innovation Fund, when supporting 
the development and uptake of climate-neutral 
products and services. As a basic principle, no EU 
money should be spent on subsidising practices 
that are harmful to the climate, like ‘clean coal’ or 
switches to unabated natural gas. Moreover, the 
Strategic Energy Technology Plan (Set Plan), which 
coordinate national research efforts, finance projects, 
adapt governance structures and develop major 
performance indicators to measure progress, could 
provide valuable lessons for supporting promising 
solutions, also in other industrial sectors.
Use taxation to incentivise and disincentivise 
investment and consumption.
q  Create a business case for ultra-low carbon processes. 
Similar to support schemes for renewable electricity 
generation, ‘contracts for difference’ should support 
the investment in low-emission technologies in 
industrial processes. These contracts would reward 
industry’s investments in low-emission technologies 
by guaranteeing a payment covering the difference 
between market and investment prices. They would 
gradually phase out as technologies reach maturity. 
ETS revenues could also be used to support contracts 
for difference. At the EU level, this would require 
guidance to standardise the practice in order to avoid 
distortions to the Single Market.
q  Use taxation to incentivise and disincentivise investment 
and consumption. Taxation remains one of the most 
powerful instruments to incentivise the reduction 
of emissions. The objective of climate neutrality 
should be fully integrated into the country-specific 
recommendations (CSRs) in the context of the 
European Semester. CSR should recommend shifting 
the tax burden towards fossil fuel or products with high 
carbon content while simultaneously providing tax 
incentives for the purchase of low-carbon products. 
q  Map infrastructural needs for industrial clusters that 
could decarbonise through the use of hydrogen and 
carbon capture, and support related investments 
via innovative financing instruments such as 
Eurobonds. These industrial clusters need cross-
border interconnections, notably for hydrogen and 
CO2. The magnitude of the required investment 
would depend on the rate of penetration of hydrogen 
and carbon capture, storage and usage, which show 
promising potential in specific regions where transit 
and storage infrastructures are already well developed. 
The mapping should, therefore, also help to address 
potential distributional consequences and identify the 
potential for peripheral industrial regions to access the 
infrastructures enabling these low-carbon processes.
q  Support industrial symbiosis in the form of collaboration 
between European companies, whereby waste material 
(e.g. heat) of one industrial facility is used as input 
feedstock for another. The EU should provide clear 
end-of-waste criteria, finance prospective pilot projects 
and facilitate partnerships and the exchange of good 
practices between industries (e.g. via stakeholder 
platforms, informative campaigns). 
q  Ensure that products in the European market are 
sustainable by design. Under the ecodesign rules and 
based on scientific evidence, the Commission should 
consider introducing new product requirements and 
guidelines for new categories of products to support 
the design of circular (e.g. durable, repairable, 
recyclable) and climate-friendly products (e.g. setting 
mandatory requirements to lower carbon content), on 
a case-by-case basis.
q  Create	a	global	level	playing	field. The EU should 
continue to collaborate and share good practices 
with its global partners, and use diplomatic and trade 
instruments to encourage global climate action. 
The aim should be to link different emission trading 
schemes and create a global price for carbon.
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Conclusion
Beyond the many difficulties confronting EU industry, 
the current challenges and megatrends also present 
considerable opportunities for industry to reinvent 
business models and become more innovative. 
European industry is demonstrating ability and interest 
to adapt and seize the opportunities in the transition. 
Still, a European strategy is imperative to support 
industry in this endeavour more proactively. 
This Issue Paper underlines some of the major 
challenges faced by industry and looks at how the EU 
has sought to develop its industrial policy. Despite 
their imperfections, EU digital, innovation and climate 
policies and the Single Market are huge assets in 
responding to some of these challenges. It is vital to 
build on these strengths when defining an Industry 
Action Plan for the EU, which admittedly is not an easy 
task. Europe does not embody the same economic power 
it once did and is facing increasingly fierce competition 
within GVCs. Given the nature of global competition, 
an effective response can only be found at the EU 
level. An Industry Action Plan could go a long way 
towards supporting industry by creating long-term jobs, 
boosting innovation, contributing to stable growth and 
reaching international commitments; such as the Paris 
Agreement and SDGs. 
This Paper suggests elements of a vision for EU industry 
towards 2030 – sustainability, competitiveness and 
strategic autonomy – and the priorities for realising 
this vision. It also provides recommendations for an EU 
Industry Action Plan: how to make the Single Market 
work; improve innovation policy and technological 
sovereignty; act strategically and enforce reciprocity; 
ensure a fair and inclusive industrial transition; and 
finally, climate proof industry with a 2050 climate 
neutrality roadmap. 
We must ensure that the current momentum for a more 
offensive EU approach in both Brussels and member 
states leads to a renewed and more concrete industrial 
strategy for Europe. ‘Muddling through’ would only 
imply ‘muddling down’.334 If Europe fails to take action, 
its industry could be left further behind. By establishing 
a new Industry Action Plan, however, the EU can 
leverage its greatest strength. By acting in unison, its 
sum is greater than its parts.
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